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STRIPPED OF MEANING: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE GOVERNMENT AS EDUCATOR 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A casual consumer of the most widely-read newspapers in 
the United States might be surprised to learn that public 
school administrators and officials can constitutionally conduct 
"strip searches" of public school students. Surprised, that is, 
because in the Summer of 2009 the Supreme Court handed 
down its decision in Safford Unified School District u. 
Redding, 1 ostensibly an "unalloyed victor[y]" for Savana 
Redding.2 As a thirteen year-old Arizona middle school honors 
student, Redding had been forced by school administrators to 
partially expose her breasts and pubic area in a fruitless search 
for ibuprofen pills that was instigated after another student 
accused her of distributing and possessing the pills on campus 
in violation of district policy.3 Sensationalized for months as 
the "strip search case," most news accounts predictably led by 
focusing on the Court's ruling 8-1 that school administrators 
had violated Redding's Fourth Amendment rights. 4 
The "common sense prevails" meme surrounding Safford's 
"unexpected" Fourth Amendment ruling, 5 however, obscured 
I. 129 S. Ct. 263::3 (2009). 
2. Editorial, The Supreme Court in Summation, L.A. TIMES, July 5, 2009, at 
A31. 
3. 129 S. Ct. at 2638. 
1. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Says Child's Rights Violated by Strip 
Search, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2009, at A16; Robert Barnes, Student Strip Search 
Illegal, WASH. POST, June 26, 2009, at AI; Editorial, Our View on School Discipline: 
Strip-search Case 8nds in Victory for Common Sense, USA TODAY, June 26, 2009, at 
12A; Editorial, An Unreasonable Search, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2009, at A21. 
5. Bob Egelko, Girl's Strip Search Ruled Unconstitutional, S.F. CH!WN., June 26, 
2009, at AS. The sophomoric "towel-snapping" attitude of some Justices at oral 
argument suggested that the Court would rule in favor of Safford Unified. See, e.g., 
Dahlia Lithwick, Ginsburg Rides Again, SLATE (June 25, 2009), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2220927/entry/2221415; see also Dahlia Lithwick, Search Me: 
The Supreme Court is Neither Hot nor Bothered by Strip Searches, SLATE (Apr. 21, 
2009), http://www.slate.com/id/2216608 (noting sarcastically that the entry for Safford 
in the "Supreme Court Concordance of Not Getting It" will read '"Court compares strip 
127 
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two equally important holdings. First, on closer examination, 
the majority opinion "appeared to leave the door open to 
searches in some circumstances,"6 by creating an amorphous 
standard that focused on school administrators' subjective 
beliefs about the "danger," "power," "quantity," or location of 
suspected contraband.7 Thus, at the same time that the Court 
appeared to "bolster[] students' privacy rights" by striking 
down one strip search,8 it carved out an ill-defined safe-harbor 
exception for others. 9 
Second, the Court held 7-2 that the school administrators 
who searched Redding were entitled to qualified immunity and 
could not be held personally liable for their actions. 10 Although 
the Court preserved Redding's claims against Safford Unified 
and remanded the case back to the trial court to determine the 
district's liability, 11 the majority pronounced the existing 
student strip search caselaw as so muddled that Safford 
Unified administrators were excused for mistakenly believing 
that strip searching Savana Redding was justified under the 
circumstances. This, almost twenty-five years after Justice 
Stevens observed in T.L.O., the first school search case to reach 
the Supreme Court, that if "[o]ne thing is clear under any 
[school search] standard[,]" it is that strip searches "have no 
place in the school house." 12 In the end, the Safford Court 
searches of 13-year-old girls to American Pie-style locker-room hijinks"') .• Justice Ruth 
Dader Ginsburg, then the only woman serving on the Court, was apparently concerned 
enough to give a rare interview in which she publicly criticized her fellow ,Justices and 
called for the inclusion of more women on the Court. See .Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg: 
Court Needs Another Woman, USA TODAY, May 5, 2009, at A1 ('"They have never been 
a 13-year-old girl. ... It's a very sensitive age for a girl. l didn't think that my 
colleagues, some of them, quite understood."'). Some scholars suspect that Ginsburg 
persuaded her colleagues on the Fourth Amendment issue. See Did a Wise Woman 
Change the Outcome of Safford v. Redding?, THE FACULTY LOUNGE, (,July 1:l, 2009), 
http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2009/07/did-a-wise-woman-justice-change-the-
outcome-of-safford-v-redding.html (last visited January 17, 2010); sec generally, 
Transcript of Oral Argument, Safford, 129 S. Ct. 263:l (No. 08-179). 
6. Egelko, supra note 5. 
7. Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 2612-1a. 
8. Egclko, supra note 5. 
9. See, e.g., Francisco M. Negron, Opposing View: Ruling Missed Opportunity, 
USA TODAY, June 26, 2009, at A12 (criticizing the Court for "miss[ingj an opportunity 
to provide clearer guidance to school officials"). 
10. Safford, 129 S. Ct. at 264:1-44. 
11. ld. at 2614. 
12. New Jersey v. 'l'.L.O., 169 U.S. :125, 382 n.25 (1985) (Stevens, .J. concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (citing Doe v. Renfrow, 6a1 F.2d 91, 92-9:l (7th Cir. 1980) 
("It does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a 1:-l-
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paradoxically appeared to ratify common sense on the one hand 
and reject it on the other. 13 
But such has been the story of the Supreme Court's public 
school caselaw, a story that in large part traces the rise of mass 
public schooling. It is no coincidence that one of the earliest 
public education-related cases to reach the Court-decided in 
the same year that Horace Mann died-allowed states financial 
flexibility in expanding the availability of public common 
schools. 14 As the bureaucratization and growth of public 
schooling increased, 15 so did the Court's number of cases 
arising out of the school context. Prior to the 1950s, the Court 
rarely heard education-related cases; 16 today, not a term goes 
by without the Court deciding several cases that impact 
schools. And, as American society and its expectations of 
schooling have evolved, the Court has played a key role in 
shaping the public school environment. Occasionally, the Court 
has staked out bold positions defying then-prevailing "common 
sense" and society eventually followed, as in the school 
desegregation cases and in student conscience. 17 At other 
times, the Court has blessed long-standing institutional 
practices, such as peer-grading, 18 or emerging trends in 
education reform, like vouchers. 19 
year-old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude."')). 
l:l. The Justices were explicitly of two minds concerning qualified immunity. 
Although Justice Stevens felt that Safford was "a case where clearly established law 
[met] clearly outrageous conduct," Justice Souter, writing for the majority, observed 
that "[tjhe unconstitutionality of outrageous conduct obviously will be unconstitutional, 
this being the reason ... that '[tjhe easiest cases don't even arise."' Compare Safford, 
129 S. Ct. at 2641 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), with 129 S. 
Ct. at 2613. 
14. Springfield v. Quick, 63 U.S. 56 (1859) (preserving the ability of states to 
allocate among towns, on the basis of need, funds raised for public schools established 
on Congressionally-set-aside lands). 
15. See DAVID B. TYACK, THE ONE BES'l' SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN URllAN 
EDUCATION (1974); see also DIANE RAVITCH, LEF'l' BACK: A CENTURY OF BATTLES OVEH 
SCHOOL REFORM (2000). 
16. See l'E[(RY A. ZIRKEL, A DIGEST OF SUPREME COURT CASES AFFECTING 
l~DUCATION (5th ed. 2009). 
17. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 18:3 (1954) (striking down "separate 
hut equal" schooling); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) 
(rejecting a requirement that students pledge allegiance to the U.S. flag or face 
discipline). 
18. Owasso lndep. Sch. Dist. No. l-Oll v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426 (2002) (upholding 
student correction of other students' work and oral reporting of grades). 
19. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding Ohio's voucher-
based Pilot Scholarship Program against an Establishment Clause challenge). 
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Yet, the Court's impact on public education extends well 
beyond its holdings and their direct and most visible effects. 
For when the Court hears education-related matters it does 
more than decide "cases and controversies,"20 it continues the 
process of defining "the role of government as educator, as 
compared with the role of government as sovereign."21 And, 
just as a teacher constructs his "teaching persona,"22 the Court 
bases its conception of the Government as Educator on its ideas 
about students, schools, and pedagogy. This continually-
evolving conception of the Government as Educator guides the 
Court in its decisionmaking, which in turn contributes to 
society's expectations for and understanding of public schools. 
Accordingly, the Court's beliefs about schooling have profound 
implications-beyond those most evident from legal doctrine-
for the evolution of public schools. 
This Article analyzes the Court's K-12 student speech and 
school search lines of caselaw in an attempt to flesh out the 
Court's evolving conception of the Government as Educator and 
evaluate what effects it has on public schools. In doing so, the 
Article metaphorically analogizes different conceptions of the 
Government as Educator to the two primary pedagogical 
approaches to student instruction, student- and teacher-
centered. The Article then argues that the Court's robust 
embrace of schools' values-inculcation function has led it to 
develop an expansive conception of the Government as 
Educator's role, one based heavily on educators' values, that 
promotes the "educationalizing of social problems,"23 appends a 
new component to the "Real Schools" paradigm,24 and ensures 
20. U.S. CONST. art. Ill,§ 2. 
21. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist No. 26 v. l'ico, 157 U.S. 853, 
909-10 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In a contentious 5-1 decision, Pica limited 
school officials' authority to remove books from public school libraries for reasons not 
directly related to "'educational suitability."' Id. at 871. 
22. David F. Labaree, Limits on the Impact of f;~ducation Reform: The Case of 
Progressivism and U.S. Schools, 1900-1950, 18 (2007) (unpublished paper presented at 
"The Century of the School: Continuity and Innovation During the First Half of the 
20th Century" Confercncte, Monte Verita, Ascona, Switzerland, September, 2007) (on 
file with author); see also LARRY CUBAN, HOW TEACHERS TAUGHT 255-56 (2d ed. 199:1) 
("What teachers know about the subjects they teach and how they use that knowledge 
with students, the beliefs they have about how children learn and develop, and the 
social attitudes they bring to their classroom shape how they teach."). 
23. David F. Labaree, The Winning Ways of a Losing Strategy: l~ducationalizing 
Social Problems in the United States, 58 EDUC. THEORY 447 (2008). 
24. Mary Haywood Metz, Real School: A Universal Drama Amid /Jisparate 
Experience, in EDUCATION POLITICS FOR THE N~;w CEN'l'Ul\Y 75-91 (Douglas K Mitchell 
r 
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that students' political socialization in schools varies depending 
on location. 
The end result suggests that the school administrators who 
strip-searched Savana Redding did so less out of a flawed 
understanding of legal doctrine than a failure to question an 
institutional culture-fostered in part by the Court's 
explication of the Government as Educator-that increasingly 
promotes the idea that "Real Schools" combat social problems. 
II. THE GOVERNMENT AS EDUCATOR 
Out of all the Supreme Court's school-related cases, the 
phrase "government as educator" has appeared in only one. In 
then-Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Board of Education v. Pica, 
he observed that "[w]hen it acts as an educator, at least at the 
[K-12] level, the government is engaged in inculcating social 
values and knowledge in relatively impressionable young 
people."25 Although the phrase might have been new to the 
Supreme Court Reporter, the concept was not; the Government 
as Educator's philosophical roots can be traced to the 
education-for-civic-virtue and values-transmission arguments 
made for and against the early common schools.26 
From the perspective of today's citizens, who have 
overwhelmingly experienced education as a state enterprise, 
governmental authority over education during the earliest 
years of the Republic might appear surprisingly weak. This 
resulted in part from early debates on the propriety of 
government control over education between Jeffersonian 
"democratic localists," who rejected state-run education as an 
illegitimate attempt to "impose social change" from the top 
down, and "paternalistic voluntarists" and "bureaucrats," who 
& Margaret E. Goertz eds., 1990). 
25. Pico, 457 U.S. at 909 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's 
explanation of the Government as Educator's role will he used throughout the Article. 
26. See Horace Mann, Twelfth Annual Report (1848), in THE REPUBLIC AND THE 
SCHOOL: HORACE MANN ON THE EDUCATION OF FREE MEN 79, 89-97 (Lawrence A. 
Cremin ed., 1957) ("However elevated the moral character of a constituency may be; 
however well informed in matters of general science or history, yet, they must, if 
citi7:ens of a Republic, understand something of the true nature and functions of the 
government under which they live."); see also Pica, 457 U.S. at 914 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (noting that public schools "fulfill the vital role of . . . 'inculcating 
fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system"' 
(citing Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979))). 
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"saw [government] precisely as the educator of the people."27 
The state-run approach not only "triumphed" as a matter of 
organizational form, 28 but also as a legitimate method of values 
transmission. So much so that over a century later Justice 
Rehnquist, elaborating on the role of Government as Educator, 
opined that "[t]he idea that [public school] students have a 
right of access, in the school, to information other than that 
thought by their educators to be necessary is contrary to the 
very nature of an inculcative education."29 
Yet, recognizing that the Government as Educator instills 
values only raises the question of which values it may 
legitimately promote. For a time, this potentiallandmine went 
relatively undisturbed, buried by a general social consensus on 
what constituted "good citizenship."30 Indeed, the 
characteristics of good citizenship were apparently so obvious 
to the early-20th century Pierce v. Society of Sisters the Court 
recognized, without elaboration, certain core areas of state 
authority in education, including the right to require "that 
certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be 
taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly 
inimical to the public welfare."31 When that consensus began to 
unravel, however, schools and legislatures were increasingly 
confronted with the thorny task of fleshing out the Government 
as Educator's values-inculcating curriculum. And, it was only a 
matter of time until those dissatisfied with that curriculum 
took their cases to court. 
27. MICHAEL KATZ, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN l~DUCATION 21-57 (1987). 
28. ld. at 2. 
29. Pica, 157 U.S. at 911 (Rehnquist, .J., dissenting). 
30. This is not to say that all segments of society accepted the consensus. See, e.g., 
HOWAIW ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (2005). 
31. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 581 (1925). Government as Educator 
values-transmission was a core issue in Pierce, in which the Court struck down an 
Oregon initiative that effectively abolished private schools. Although one would not 
learn of it from reading the Court's opinion, the law had been passed during a time of 
rising anti-Catholic and nativist sentiment and was promoted hy a then-influential Ku 
Klux Klan. See, e.g., PAULA AHRAMS, CROSS PURPOSES: PIERCE V. SOCIETY OF SISTERS 
AND THE STRUGGLE OVER COMPULSORY PUHLIC EDUCATION 7-H (2009). In some sense 
then, Pierce represents an early example of the Court correcting Government-as-
Educator malfeasance. 
r 
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A. Pedagogical Theories 
The Supreme Court's approach towards deciding cases in 
the student speech and school search context, especially since 
the late-1970s, 32 has generally been one of deference to the 
decisions of state and local policymakers, 33 who most often are 
the human incarnation of the Government as Educator. For 
roughly a thirty-year period stretching from the middle of the 
Second World War until the mid-1970s, however, that 
deference was tempered by a more robust conception of student 
autonomy and the role students assumed as (compelled) 
participants in the schooling process. Perhaps taking a cue 
from its contemporaneously evolving school desegregation 
jurisprudence, the Court during this period was relatively less 
reluctant to police the Government as Educator's relationship 
with, and authority over, its students. This is not to say that 
public schools during this period exemplified progressive 
educational pedagogy or tolerated expansive student 
autonomy~with few exceptions they were not~but rather to 
note the Court's more solicitous treatment of students' 
interests during the burgeoning civil rights movement in cases 
concerning a variety of issues. In each of these two periods~ 
one more solicitous to students' "rights" than the other~the 
Court's conception of the Government as Educator can be 
compared to one of the two dominant pedagogical 
"traditions . . . [that] have shaped classroom instruction: 
teacher-centered and student-centered."34 
During the earlier period, the Court emphasized a more 
student-centered pedagogical role for the Government as 
Educator. A student-centered, or "progressive," pedagogical 
approach views students as semi-independent individuals who 
"exercise a substantial degree of responsibility for what is 
82. See, e.f?., Richard Arum & Doreet Preiss, Law & Disorder, EDUC. NEXT 59, 60 
(Fall 2009) (observing the Court's "post-1975 pattern of sympathy with schools"). 
aa. The Court's school desq,>Tegation caselaw obviously overruled the decisions of 
some policymakers and has been the subject of much scholarship. See, e.g., J. HARVIE 
WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL 
DES~;GREGATION (1979). From the perspective advocated in this Article, the Court was 
guided by a "student-centered" conception of the Government as Educator in its 
desegregation jurisprudence. That discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
::H. Larry Cuban, Hugging the Middle: Teaching in an Era of Testing and 
Accountability, 1980-2005, 15 EDUC. PoL'Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1, :i (2007); see 
generally CUBAN, supra note 22. 
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taught and how it is learned."35 Student-centered classrooms 
often utilize group projects and learning activities so that 
students may acquire knowledge experientially. Educators in 
student-centered classrooms perform a carefully calibrated 
balancing act: they must simultaneously maintain control over 
and incorporate students in various "decisions [that] touch the 
core of the teacher's authority."36 Accordingly, for the purposes 
of this Article, the student-centered Government as Educator 
takes a "learn by doing" approach to education for citizenship 
in which students are given greater latitude to practice 
citizenship in schools. 
Since the mid-1970s, however, the Court has emphasized a 
more teacher-centered role for the Government as Educator. 
Students enjoy limited autonomy in teacher-centered 
classrooms; teachers "controlD what is taught, when, and under 
what conditions" and "transmit knowledge, skills, and values to 
students.'m Teacher-centered classrooms tend to feature 
stereotypical accoutrements such as lectures, textbooks, and 
desks arranged in rows facing the source of instruction. 
Students take notes and earn grades based on achievement on 
series of assignments and evaluative exams. Students have 
little to no influence over core decisions. If this sounds familiar, 
it is because teacher-centered pedagogy historically has been 
the dominant mode of instruction in public schools and remains 
the approach encountered by most students on a day-to-day 
basis.38 Thus, under the teacher-centered Government as 
Educator, students are told how to be good citizens and 
expected to conform. 
The teacher-centered and student-centered roles outlined 
above stand at opposite ends of a continuum, but in reality 
educators increasingly use various iterations of hybridized 
"teacher-centered progressivism" that fall at points between 
the two extremes.39 In some cases, teachers' blending of the two 
styles stems from genuinely held pedagogical beliefs. At other 
35. Cuban, supra note 31, at :i. 
36. CUBAN, supra note 22, at 271. 
37. Cuban, supra note 34, at 3. 
38. See, e.g., CUBAN, supra note 22; see also David K. Cohen, Teaching Practice: 
Plus ()a Change ... , in CONTRIBU'l'!NG TO EDUCATIONAL CHANm; 27-tl1 (Phillip W. 
Jackson ed., 1988) (examining the failure of student·centered pedagogy to displace 
teacher-centered instruction). 
39. See Cuban, supra note :H, at 20-22. 
r 
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times, however, the "blending" represents little more than a 
formalist attempt to imbue a "student-centered patina"40 to a 
teacher-centered classroom out of a sense of duty to implement 
perceived "best practices."41 
An examination of the Government as Educator's 
development in key student speech and school search cases in 
light of the two pedagogical "strands" uncovers similar 
formalism at work in the Court's current conception of the 
Government as Educator. Although the Court pays rhetorical 
homage to the student-centered opinions of yesterday,42 it has 
nevertheless adopted a strongly teacher-centered conception of 
Government as Educator based upon, and highly deferential to, 
the ever-expanding goals and values of school administrators. 
As this Article argues below, if the Constitution has been "for 
all practical purposes turned over to the Supreme Court,"43 the 
Court has delegated responsibility for distinguishing the 
government's separate roles as educator and sovereign in the 
student speech and school search contexts to the authorities 
often most eager to merge them. 
B. The Student-Centered Strand 
The idea that students should enjoy a sense of autonomy in 
pedagogical decisionmaking is an historical anomaly.44 So, too, 
are conceptions regarding an expanded scope of permissible 
student expressiOn. As Justice Thomas argued in his 
concurrence in Morse, student "free-speech" rights were 
unknown for much of public schools' early history.45 Rather, 
10. hi. at 22. 
41. /d. at 21-22. 
12. Tink:er's statement that students "do not shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," for example, frequently 
appears in education-related cases. See, e.g., Ed. of Educ. of lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of 
Pottawatomie County. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines 
lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., :-393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
43. Larry D. Kramer, "The Interest of the Man':· James Madison, Popular 
Constitutionalism, and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 
697 (2006). 
41. See Cohen, supra note 38, at 39 (noting that student-centered "conceptions of 
instruction are a radical departure from inherited ideas and practices" in which 
teachers "are tellers of truth who inculcate knowledge in [passive] students"). 
15. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410-12 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("If 
students in public schools were originally understood as having free-speech rights, one 
would have expected 19th-century public schools to have respected those rights and 
courts to have enforced them. They did not."). 
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"teachers taught, and students listened. Teachers commanded, 
and students obeyed. Teachers did not rely solely on the power 
of ideas to persuade; they relied on discipline to maintain 
order."46 
The rise of "pedagogical progressivism" in the twentieth 
century, however, challenged this thinking and posited that 
experiential learning was critical to student development.47 
Although student-centered instruction made little headway in 
America's classrooms,48 its lexicon flourished as a rhetorical 
addition to the "grammar of schooling."49 By 1918, for example, 
the "Cardinal Principles Report" argued that students were 
most productive and motivated to learn when schools took into 
account students' "dominant interests" and allowed students to 
explore those interests with limited guidance.50 This included 
providing students "the means for developing attitudes and 
habits important in a democracy," of which "the democratic 
organization and administration of the school itself as well as 
the cooperative relations of pupil and teacher" were 
"indispensable."51 Whether schools actually allowed students to 
take an experiential approach to civic education was a different 
story; after all, despite such rhetoric schools were still by and 
large "not places for freewheeling debates or exploration of 
competing ideas."52 The Court, however, would incorporate this 
student-centered view of civic education in a groundbreaking 
decision that questioned popular treatment of perhaps the 
nation's most visible patriotic symbol. 
46. Id. at 112. 
47. See, e.g, John Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum. in THE SCHOOL AND 
SOCIETY AND THE CHILD AND THB CURRICULUM 181-209 (Philip W. Jackson ed., 1991) 
("Abandon the notion of subject-matter as something fixed and ready-made in itself, 
outside the child's experience; cease thinking of the child's experience as also 
something hard and fast; see it is as something fluent, embryonic, vital .... "). 
48. See, e.g., CUBAN, supra note 22. 
19. DAVID TYACK & LARRY CUBA!'J, TINKEIUNG TOWARDS UTOPIA (1995) (this is the 
"rhetoric of reform"). 
50. Comm. on the Reorg. of Secondary Educ., Cardinal Principles of Secondary 
Education, reprinted in DEP'T OF THE lNTEf!IOI!, BUREAU OF EDUC., BULL. 1918, No. :35. 
15-16 (1918) (arguing that education- and vocation-related "decisions should not be 
imposed upon [students] by others") (electronic transcription on file with author). 
51. Jd. at 8. 
52. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. :39:3, 411 (2007) (Thomas, .J., concurring). 
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1. Gobitis and Barnette 
It seems incongruous with the strongly patriotic aura 
surrounding the "Greatest Generation" in the nation's 
collective memory53 that during the midst of the Second World 
War the Court struck down a state-imposed requirement that 
students recite the Pledge of Allegiance. 54 Board of Education 
v. Barnette, one of the first cases to expand students' expressive 
rights in schools, directly repudiated the Court's decision in 
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, which had just three 
years earlier upheld a similar regulation over the religious-
based objections of Jehovah's Witness students and their 
families. 55 The contrasting language used by the Court in 
Gobitis and Barnette highlights the difference between the 
Court's teacher-centered and student-centered conceptions of 
the Government as Educator. 
The tropes used to justify the Court's modern-day 
deferential treatment of state and local policy judgments can be 
traced in part to the rhetoric used in Gobitis, where the Court 
famously refused to play "school board for the country" and 
disclaimed any desire become an "arena for debating issues of 
educational policy."56 The Gobitis Court viewed the 
Government as Educator's role in explicitly teacher-centered 
terms: school authorities created and disseminated a values 
curriculum and students listened. Those with different values 
were expected to leave them at home. Although the Court 
hinted that it believed the school district's policy was an 
ineffective means of promoting patriotic values, 57 it refused on 
institutional competency grounds to engage in a debate with 
state and local authorities over the "wisdom" of using the 
compulsive mechanisms inherent in schools as means to 
inculcate values. 58 The Court also declined to police the 
5:3. See TOM BROKAW, THE GREATEST GENERATION (1998). 
51. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, a 19 U.S. 621 (194a). 
55. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, :no U.S. 586 (1940). 
56. !d. at 598. 
57. !d. ("For ourselves, we might be tempted to say that the deepest patriotism is 
best engendered by giving unfettered scope to the most crochety beliefs. Perhaps it is 
best ... to give to the least popular sect leave from conformities like those here in 
issue."'). 
58. !d. at 597-98 (reasoning that to strike down the mandatory-pledge 
requirement "would amount to no less than the pronouncement of pedagogical and 
psychological dogma in a field where courts possess no marked and certainly no 
controlling competence"). 
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substance of that values instruction; the Government as 
Educator's decision "that a particular program or exercise will 
best promote in the minds of children who attend the common 
schools an attachment to the institutions of their country" 
served as sufficient evidence of curricular soundness. 59 Such 
decisions were not open to challenge by students and their 
parents except through persuasion and "the remedial channels 
of the democratic process."60 Indeed, the Court went so far as to 
suggest that educational policymakers had "the right to 
awaken in the child's mind considerations ... contrary to those 
implanted by the parent."61 Provided that school authorities 
validly enacted a policy, the Court could not grant "exceptional 
immunity" to those on the losing side of the debate without 
undermining both the legitimacy of the decisionmaking process 
and the efficacy of the resulting values curriculum.62 In 
pedagogical terms, that would have meant forcing the 
Government as Educator to cede control of core decisions 
related to teacher authority. And that the Court was unwilling 
to do. 
But only for a short time. Only three years later, the Court 
made an about-face and struck down a West Virginia school 
district's "flag salute" policy that "contain[ed] recitals taken 
largely from the Court's Gobitis opinion."63 The Barnette 
majority largely dispensed with the Gobitis Court's concern for 
preserving the Government as Educator's teacher-centered 
authority to prescribe values-based instruction, replacing it 
instead with a then-novel and rhetorically-sweeping student-
centered vision of the Government as Educator. Where Gobitis 
saw students as classical receptors of teacher-transmitted 
knowledge, Barnette portrayed students as "conscientious 
objectors" with "free minds"64 possessing "the right of self-
determination in matters that touch individual opinion and 
personal attitude."65 
59. Jd. at 598-99. 
60. Id. at 599. 
61. ld.; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 211, 215 (1972) (Douglas, .J., 
dissenting) ("It is the student's judgment, not his parents', that is essential if we are to 
give full meaning to what we have said about the Bill of Rights and of the right of 
students to be masters of their own destiny."). 
62. Gobitis, :310 U.S. at 600. 
63. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, :319 U.S. 624 (194:3). 
61. ld. at 611 (Black & Douglas, .J.J., concurring). 
65. ld. at 631 (majority opinion). 
1] STRIPPED OF MEANING 139 
Contra Gobitis, the Barnette Court had no compunctions 
about institutional competency and refused to assume the 
inherent legitimacy of school-imposed civic-values 
curriculum.66 In fact, the Barnette majority turned this central 
tenet of Gobitis on its head and suggested that small 
governmental bodies require greater oversight because, by the 
very nature of representing local constituencies, they 
necessarily reflect local prejudices that "may feel less sense of 
responsibility to the Constitution."67 The Court argued that 
such monitoring was especially necessary in the case of state 
and local school authorities, who had historically been tasked 
with regulating the selection and transmission of civic values.68 
It was, after all, a strange form of education for citizenship that 
taught "that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right 
to speak his own mind, left it open to public authorities to 
compel him to utter what is not in his mind."69 
Barnette made clear that the Government as Educator 
could continue to inculcate values and promote civic education, 
but not through policies that compelled students to hold certain 
prescribed beliefs or participate in activities and ceremonies in 
violation of their First Amendment rights. 70 Barnette, however, 
provided little guidance regarding the extent of those rights. It 
did not suggest, for example, when and to what degree school 
authorities could engage m behavior that might be 
characterized as coercive, an issue the Court continues to 
66. !d. at 6:-!9 (repudiating the idea that the Court's "duty to apply the Bill of 
Rights to assertions of official authority depend[sj upon our possession of marked 
competence in the field where the invasion of rights occurs."); id. at 635-36 ("The 
question which underlies the flag salute controversy is whether such a ceremony so 
touching matters of opinion and political attitude may be imposed upon the individual 
by official authority under powers committed to any political organization under our 
Constitution. We examine rather than assume existence of this power .... "). 
67. Id. at 637 (comparing the "relatively trivial" local compulsory policies at issue 
in Barnette with Congressionally-created voluntary policies and observing that "[t]here 
are village tyrants as well as village Hampdens"). 
68. /d. ("That [school boards] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for 
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to 
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of 
our government as mere platitudes."). 
69. /d. at 631. 
70. Id. at 612 (holding that "the action of the local authorities in compelling the 
flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades 
the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our 
Constitution to reserve from all official control"). 
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debate.71 And, despite the decision's student-centered rhetoric, 
it failed to outline what limits schools could place on students 
when they elected to affirmatively express their now-protected 
consciences. 
Yet, the opinion contained the ingredients for a student-
centered speech standard. In describing the Barnette plaintiffs 
and their actions, the Court found it significant that the 
students' "peaceab[le] and orderly" behavior did "not interfere 
with or deny rights of others" to participate in the pledge. 72 A 
quarter-century after Barnette, the Warren Court would craft a 
student speech standard out of these characteristics that 
ostensibly was so radical that Justice Black accused the Court 
of "surrender[ing] control of the American public school system 
to public school students.'03 
2. Tinker 
Given the resurgence of the teacher-centered Government 
as Educator over the past three decades, 74 it might be an 
overstatement to say that "[t]he Supreme Court's decision in 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 
did for the ideal of expressive freedom in America's public 
schools what Brown u. Board of Education did for the idea of 
racial equality."75 As a matter of rhetoric, however, this 
characterization does not miss the mark by far: every school 
principal who has had to endure a hostile parent meeting can 
thank Justice Fortas and his majority opinion for the oft-
repeated claim that "state-operated schools may not be 
enclaves of totalitarianism."76 
71. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 639, 612 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the Court, in upholding an Establishment Clause challenge against a 
district's selecting clergy to deliver nonsectarian prayers at a public school graduation, 
made no distinction between subtle "psychological coercion" and the "legal sanctions" in 
Barnette); see also Santa Fe lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 5cl0 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that 
a district's reservation of time for student speech, which could include invocations, over 
a public address system before football games constituted impermissible coercion in 
violation of the Establishment Clause). 
72. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 6:30. 
73. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., :193 U.S. 503, 525 (1969) 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
74. Discussed infra Part II.C. 
75. Jamie B. Raskin, No Enclaves of Totalitarianism: The Triumph and 
Unrealized Promise of the Tinker Decision, 58 AM. U. L. R~w. 1193, 119:l (2009). 
76. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. 
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For the bombastic rhetoric of the opinion, the facts giving 
rise to Tinker appear surprisingly quaint when looking back 
from the perspective of the twenty-first century. In December 
1965, in an act of political awareness that teachers today might 
find refreshing,77 a group of teenagers and children ranging in 
age from eight to sixteen joined their parents in an act of 
protest against the then-nascent Vietnam War by wearing 
small black armbands emblazoned with the now-ubiquitous 
peace symbol. Before the students had a chance to wear the 
armbands to school, Des Moines school authorities "adopted a 
policy that any student wearing an armband to school would be 
asked to remove it, and if he refused he would be suspended 
until he returned without the armband."78 Although school 
officials would later try to justify the policy by claiming that 
they were trying to prevent disruption, the record indicated 
that "school authorities simply felt that 'the schools [were] no 
place for demonstrations."'79 When the students attempted to 
wear the armbands to school, however, they were suspended 
for what amounted to the time of instruction remaining before 
the Winter Holidays. A lawsuit ensued. After two lower court 
victories for the school district, the case finally reached the 
Supreme Court in late-1968 during a much different political 
and social climate. 
The Court sided with the students, analogizing their 
armbands to "pure speech" protected by the First 
Amendment, 80 and famously arguing that students do not 
"shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate."81 The Court's language 
evinced a much stronger student-centered conception of the 
Government as Educator than Barnette. In Tinker, students 
not only had a right to be free from the coercive imposition of 
government-sanctioned beliefs, 82 they "could not be confined to 
the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved" 
77. Or mere parroting of their parents' political beliefs. See :19:1 U.S. at 516 
(Black, J .. dissenting). 
78. /d. at 501 (majority opinion). 
79. !d. at 509 n.:>. (quoting school officials as saying that "if the students 'didn't 
like the way our elected officials were handling things, it should be handled with the 
ballot box and not in the halls of our public schools"'). 
80. ld. at 506. 
81. !d. at 507-08. 
82. ld. at 511 ("In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit 
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate."). 
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and were "entitled to freedom of expression of their views."~3 
And, lest school officials missed the scope of the Court's 
decision, it cited with approval language from a higher-
education case that described classrooms as "marketplace[s] of 
ideas" where students, as potential "leaders," were "trained 
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which 
discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than 
through any kind of authoritative selection."'84 Indeed, "this 
sort of hazardous freedom," the Court opined, formed the "basis 
of our national strength."85 It was this rhetoric that prompted 
Justice Stewart to write a separate one-paragraph concurrence 
just to clarify that he did not believe in the Court's apparently 
"uncritical assumption" that "the First Amendment rights of 
children are co-extensive with those of adults."86 
Yet, the Tinker Court's rhetorical excesses made it easy to 
miss two important caveats that later Courts would use to 
cabin the decision's broad sweep. First, the Court qualified its 
extension of First Amendment rights by noting that they were 
"applied in light of the special characteristics of the school 
environment,"87 suggesting that whatever the scope of 
students' rights, they were not~contrary to Justice Stewart's 
fear~the same freedoms adults enjoyed outside of school. 
Second, borrowing language from a Fifth Circuit case, the 
Court provided a two-prong standard for student speech. 
Provided that school administrators do not suppress speech out 
of a "mere desire to avoid the discomfort and displeasure that 
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint,"88 they can restrict 
student speech that "'materially and substantially interfer[es] 
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the 
operation of the school"' or "collid[es] with the rights of 
others."89 And, as many mischievous students have learned, 
88. /d. 
81. Id. at 512 (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, :l85 U.S. 589, 60:l (1967)). 
85. Id. at 509. 
86. Id. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
87. Id. at 506 (majority opinion). This phrase opened the door to schools' inclusion 
in the Court's Fourth Amendment "special needs" doctrine. See New .Jersey v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. :325, :311, n.6 (1985) (citing various sources in n.2 of the majority opinion 
supporting a special needs approach). 
88. ld. at 509. 
89. ld. at 518 (citing Burnside v. Byars, :36:3 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1966)). The Court 
immediately restated this standard to apply to behavior that "materially disrupts 
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others," although 
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"material and substantial interference" is a nebulous standard 
that has been largely defined in the eye of the school 
administrator. 
Taken on balance, then, the Tinker Court, albeit in perhaps 
unnecessarily bombastic language, presents a student-centered 
conception of the Government as Educator in which students, 
guided along by cooperative-not authoritarian-educators, 
actively learn citizenship by acting as proto-citizens in school. 
Contrary to Justice Black's dissent, Tinker did not itself usher 
in this "new revolutionary era of permissiveness" in schools.90 
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, American 
education was headed down that that road long before,91 and 
certainly not because, Mary Beth Tinker's peace sign-sporting 
armband "practically 'wrecked"' her math teacher's lesson.92 
Tinker represented just one aspect of a changing school 
environment that increasingly allowed student autonomy in 
areas ranging from curricular choice to classroom 
participation. 93 At an even larger level, 94 Tinker was of a piece 
with other contemporaneous social changes that were reflected 
in schools and school policies.95 During the same period, for 
example, the Court considered cases involving the teaching of 
evolution in public schools, 96 the right to control student 
picketers,97 the due process rights of students facing short-term 
suspensions, 98 the liability of school officials for damages, 99 the 
many analyses use the different renderings interchangeably. Compare, e.g., Morse v. 
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 40:-l (2007) with 551 U.S. at 117 (Thomas, J., concurring) and 
551 U.S. at 423-21 (Alito, J., concurring) and 551 U.S. at 429 (Breyer, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part) and 551 U.S. at 136-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
90. Tinher, 393 U.S. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting). 
91. See, e.g., RAVITCH, supra note 15. 
92. Tinher, 393 U.S. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting). 
93. See, e.g., A.HTHUR G. POWELL, ELEANOR Fi\lWAR & DAVID K. COHEN, THE 
SHOPPIN(; MALL HIGH SCHOOL (1985). 
94. The growth of rights-consciousness activity increased especially rapidly after 
the Second World War with the accelerating of the Civil Rights Movement. See 
generally JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS (1996). 
95. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HIS'I'OHY OF AM~;I{ICAN LAW 523-:n (3d 
ed. 2001). 
96. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (striking down a state law that 
prohibited teaching evolution because the theory conflicted with the Bible). 
97. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 108 U.S. 101 (1972) (upholding an ordinance that 
prohibited substantially disruptive noise, but striking down a blanket ordinance 
proscribing picketing near schools). 
98. Goss v. Lopez, 119 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (providing students "rudimentary" 
due process rights even for short-term disciplinary suspensions). 
99. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (requiring good faith efforts to qualify 
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propriety of corporal punishment, 100 and the rights of 
undocumented immigrant students to attend public school. 101 
C. The Teacher-Centered Strand's Renaissance 
Few of the Court's similarly student-centered decisions, 
however, have incurred the opprobrium heaped upon Tinker by 
those who, like Justice Thomas, believe that the decision was 
"without basis in the Constitution" and "extend[ed] [student's 
speech rights] well beyond traditional bounds." 102 Critics of the 
decision would argue in the following years for a resurgent 
teacher-centered view of the Government as Educator, 103 
claiming that the Court had impermissibly installed itself in 
that role in place of legislative authorities and school 
policymakers and deprived them the institutional authority 
and legitimacy necessary to grapple with the broader social 
changes of the late-1960s and early-1970s. 104 Justice Black's 
warning that Tinker portended the day when students "in all 
schools will be ready, able, and willing to defy their teachers on 
practically all orders" 105 seemed in retrospect "prophetic," 106 as 
social changes manifested themselves in schools in the form of 
increased conflict between students and educators, school 
violence, drug use, student apathy, and the degeneration of 
longstanding social norms. 107 In some sense, Ingraham u. 
Wright's preservation of corporal punishment against an 
Eighth Amendment challenge in 1977 represented more a 
repudiation of the perceived failure of student-centered 
approaches to maintain discipline in schools than a real 
for immunity from liability). 
100. Ingraham v. Wright, 130 U.S. 651 (1977) (upholding corporal puni~hment). 
101. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (allowing undocumented students a frPe 
and appropriate public education). 
102. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. :19:-l, 410, 416 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
103. Goss, 419 U.S. at 590 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[S]chool authorities must have 
broad discretionary authority in the daily operation of public schools. This includes 
wide latitude with respect to maintaining discipline and good order." (citing Tinker v. 
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., :393 U.S. 503, 507 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting))). 
104. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson Ill, Goss u. Lopez: The Supreme Court as School 
Superintendent, 1975 SUP. CT. Rrw. 25 (1975). 
105. Tinker, 39;:3 U.S. at 525 (Black, ,J ., dissenting). 
106. Morse, 551 U.S. at 421 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
107. See, e.g., GERALD GRANT, THE WORLD WE CREATED i\T HAMILTON HinH 24-76 
(1988). 
[ 
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defense of physical punishment as a means of ensurmg 
order. 108 
Since Tinker, the Court has revisited student speech in K-
12 schools on three occasions, each time ruling against the 
student. The Court has also created a line of cases concerning 
students' Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable 
searches, ruling against the student in all but the most recent, 
Safford, which, as described in the Introduction, was not 
necessarily a victory for students' rights. In these cases, the 
Court has reemphasized a teacher-centered conception of the 
Government as Educator, but one that seems focused on 
inculcating morals, rather than patriotism, and prohibiting, 
rather than compelling, student activity. Accordingly, the 
Court's modern teacher-centered Government as Educator 
promotes a values curriculum of greater potential scope 
because its tenets are derived from the moral sensibilities of 
school authorities, which encompass a more expansive array of 
matters than those associated with traditional patriotism-
based approaches. 
This does not mean that education-for-citizenship rhetoric 
has disappeared from the Court's student speech and school 
search-related opinions. Instead, the inculcation of moral 
sensibilities has been clothed in the language of education for 
citizenship. The Court has not abandoned student-centered 
conceptions of the Government as Educator, but they have been 
relegated to dissenting opinions. 
1. Student Speech 
Although the timing was almost certainly coincidental, the 
release of A Nation at Risk, a report by the National 
Committee on Excellence in Education that was sharply critical 
of the state of American education, 109 within a year of the film 
Fast Times at Ridgemont High seemingly could not have been 
planned any better. 110 A Nation at Risk's dire warning that the 
"educational foundations of our society [were] being eroded by a 
108. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 681, n.53 (1977) (5-4 decision) (noting that 
"corporal punishment serves important educational interests" and that the Court's 
"judgment must be viewed in light of the disciplinary problems commonplace in the 
schools," which the majority deemed "seriousO"). 
109. NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, A NATION AT RISK 
(1983). 
110. FAST TIMES AT lilllGEMONT HIGH (Universal Pictures 1982). 
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nsmg tide of mediocrity" 111 could have been directed at Jeff 
Spicoli, the habitually-tardy, ordering-pizza-in-class, 
surfer/stoner-cum-Falstaff of Fast Times. 112 A Nation at Risk, 
"uniquely a document of the early 1980s," capitalized on a 
"heap of public discontent about schooling that had been 
accumulating since the sixties" and reignited a national debate 
on the sorry state of American public schools and low student 
achievement. 113 Given this environment, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that two of the earliest cases cutting against the 
student-centered Government as Educator, Bethel School 
District v. Fraser and New Jersey v. T.L.O., involved students 
engaging in stereotypical teenage misbehavior: giVmg a 
sexually-suggestive speech at a school assembly and smoking 
cigarettes in a school bathroom. T.L.O., a search case, will be 
discussed below. 
The facts of Fraser almost seem too innocuous to have gone 
all the way to the Supreme Court. 114 In the spring of 1983, a 
high school senior gave a nominating speech for a friend at a 
school assembly. 115 The majority opinion did not excerpt the 
speech, instead describing it only as "an elaborate, graphic, and 
explicit sexual metaphor." 116 Justice Brennan, believing the 
speech to be far from "lewd" but impermissible for a school 
setting, included the speech in his concurrence: 
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in 
his shirt, his character is firm-but most ... of all, his belief 
in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man 
who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take 
an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in 
spurts--he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally-
he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even 
the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for 
111. A Ni\TION AT RISK, supra note 109. 
112. FAST TlMES AT RIDGEMONT HIGH, supra note 110 (describing, for example, a 
critical moment in U.S. History: "What Jefferson was saying was, 'Hey! You know, we 
left this England place 'cause it was bogus; so if we don't get some cool rules 
ourselves-pronto-we'll just be bogus too!'"). 
113. Raviteh, A Historic Document, in 0UH SCHOOLS & OUR FUTURE 29-:10 (Paul E. 
Peterson ed., 2003). 
114. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 40:1 v. Fraser, 178 U.S. 675 (1986). 
115. Jd. at 677. 
116. /d. at 678. 
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A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never come between you and the 
best our high school can be. 117 
147 
School officials suspended Fraser for a few days and 
revoked his privilege to speak at graduation, although this 
latter sanction was eventually reconsidered. He nonetheless 
sued, claiming that the district had violated his civil rights, 
and won in both lower courts. 118 
The Supreme Court, however, ruled against Fraser in an 
opinion that limited the scope of allowable student speech 
under Tinker by cabining off an exception for "sexually explicit, 
indecent, or lewd speech." 119 Although the district made no 
showing that Fraser's remarks had disrupted the educational 
process, 120 a key part of the Tinker analysis, the Court read in 
an implied corollary to the substantial-disruption prong 
providing that "the schools, as instruments of the state, may 
determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct 
cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or 
offensive speech," even in the absence of a substantial 
disruption. 121 And, citing Tinker itself, the Court reasoned that 
once this interest in promoting good conduct was accepted, the 
school was justified in "inculcating" students with such "shared 
values of a civilized order." 122 On the whole, this was not a 
terribly controversial conclusion: it did little more than 
officially deputize school officials in the "War Against Bad 
Words," a war that school officials had been fighting for 
generations without an institution as august as the Supreme 
Court's formal recognition. 
Yet, the decision's robust language, harkening back to 
Gobitis and a strongly teacher-centered conception of the 
Government as Educator, suggested that Fraser's reach might 
be greater than it first appeared. For one thing, there was the 
fact that the majority had taken mildly off-color student speech 
that would pass as a "routine comment" in the halls and locker 
rooms of many American schools 123 and pronounced it "sexually 
117. /d. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
118. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 103 v. Fraser, 755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985). 
119. Fraser, 4 78 U.S. at 684. 
120. ld. at 690 (Marshall, J ., dissenting). 
121. /d. at 683. 
122. ld. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 
(1967)). 
123. /d. at 696 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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explicit," "lewd," "indecent," "offensive," and the product of a 
"confused boy." 124 Such descriptors seemed inapposite given the 
lack of a substantial disruption, 125 but the Court's 
characterization nonetheless gave school administrators 
judicial sanction to portray similarly mild student speech in 
stark terms. This gave school authorities a tactical blueprint to 
end-around Tinker by allowing them to use characterizations of 
student actions as a proxy for or predictor of substantial 
disruption, effectively decreasing the realm in which students 
could potentially exercise Tinker's "hazardous freedom." 
Outside of the student-speech context, the same tactic surfaces 
in zero-tolerance student discipline policies that, for example, 
consider a six-year-old's Cub Scout-approved "camping utensil" 
containing a fork, knife, and spoon, a dangerous "weapon." 126 
Moreover, the tone of the education-for-citizenship 
language in the Fraser majority's opmwn enlisted the 
Government as Educator as inculcator of more than just the 
values of polite conversation. Fraser exhorted school 
authorities to take up the battle of inculcating the 
"fundamental values of 'habits and manners of civility' 
essential to a democratic society" and teaching students "the 
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior." 127 Again, not 
entirely objectionable goals in and of themselves. The Court, 
however, fashioned this mission from two different sources of 
authority, tailoring it to fit Fraser's facts, and retaining the 
original sources' strong education-for-citizenship rhetoric, 12x 
124. Id. at 683-84. Justice Stevens later took pams to note that Fraser was 
actually "an outstanding young man with a fine academic record.'' !d. at 692 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
125. Id. at 691 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that "the school counselor whose 
testimony the District relies upon, [said] the reaction of the student body 'was not 
atypical to a high school auditorium assembly,"' and arguing that "a noisy response to 
the speech and sexually suggestive movements by three students in a crowd of 600 fail 
to rise to the level of a material interference with the educational process''). 
126. See Ian Urbina, It's a Fork, It:s a Spoon, it's a ... Weapon?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
11, 2009, at A1. 
127. Fraser, 178 U.S. at 681. 
128. The majority cites an historical work by the Beards for the idea that '"[pjublic 
education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic .... It must inculcate the 
habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as 
indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community and the nation." !d. 
(citing CHARLES A. BEAHD & MARY R. B~:AIW, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF 'I'HE UNITED 
STATES 228 (1968)). It then joined this to Ambach v. Norwich's similar description. 
which saw the "objectives of public education as the 'inculcat[ion of] fundamental 
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system."' !d. (citing 111 
r 
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which in their original contexts were concerned much more 
with the inculcation of socio-political democratic values than 
hazy notions of what essentially amounted to democratic 
politeness. As with the allegedly self-evident concept of "good 
citizenship" from an earlier era, the Court failed to give 
definition to these "fundamental values" and "socially 
appropriate behavior" other than to suggest that they excluded 
Fraser-like offensive speech. This definitional process, the 
Fraser Court opined, belonged to the same local educational 
authorities suspected of near-subversive activities in 
Barnette. 129 And, instilling these apparently school-board 
defined "values is truly the 'work of the schools."' 130 
Fraser, however, did more than exhume Gobitis's school-
board deferential rhetoric-it expanded it. Near the end of the 
Fraser majority's opinion, the decision suggests that school 
authorities have the right to "disassociate" from student 
actions that are "wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental 
values' of public school education" or serve to "undermine the 
school's basic educational mission." 131 Indeed, the school 
district in Morse made exactly this argument nearly twenty 
years later while attempting to justify a principal's decision to 
take down a student banner that she regarded as advocating 
drug use. 132 Thus, the Court enhanced school boards' authority 
to proscribe student speech behavior far beyond that directly at 
issue in Fraser; because as school authorities define those 
fundamental values and educational missions, those values 
necessarily will shift with prevailing societal assumptions and 
expectations about schooling. And, as those values become 
U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)). 
129. !d. at 683 ("The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or 
in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board."). 
130. Jd. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 508 
(1967)). This is arguably a disingenuous use of the "work of the schools" language in 
Tinker. The phrase "work of the school" appears only three times in Tinker, and then in 
contexts that strongly suggest the Tinker Court used the phrase to refer to the normal 
operation of schools rather than the inculcation of any values. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 
508 (" ... this case docs not concern speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the 
schools or the rights of other students.") ("There is no indication that the work of the 
schools or any class was disrupted.") (" ... our independent examination of the record 
fails to yield evidence that the school authorities had reason to anticipate that the 
wearing of the armbands would substantially interfere with the work of the school or 
impinge upon the rights of other students."). 
131. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685-86. 
1::32. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 39::3, 397-98 (2007). 
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more teacher-centered, students experience correspondingly 
less-solicitous treatment of their autonomy-related interests. 
This line of thought runs directly contrary to Tinker's spirit, 
which envisioned students exerc1smg relatively static 
constitutional rights as practicing proto-citizens. Instead, it 
allows school authorities the power to affirmatively define 
student rights in myriad ways. 
One other notable shift towards teacher-centeredness in 
Fraser concerns the Court's depiction of high school students as 
a captive and vulnerable population. 133 The Fraser Court 
justified its decision in part based on a case which upheld the 
right of the FCC to regulate "indecent but not obscene" 
broadcasts during hours children might listen to the radio 
because children are a vulnerable population in need of 
protection. 134 Recently, this argument has resurfaced in at 
least one student "hate speech" case that relied on Tinker's 
second prong concerning the "rights of others," 135 and at least 
one commentator has viewed the same line of argumentation 
as justifying a "student welfare" standard for regulating 
student speech. 136 This contrasts with the tone of Tinker, which 
suggests that schools are not only capable of tolerating 
offensive language that does not substantially disrupt school 
operations, but that they are places where students should be 
able to acclimate themselves to a relatively unregulated and 
hurly-burly "real world" of discourse on the other side of high 
school graduation. Taken together, the Court, now with a more 
conservative membership, had essentially signaled to school 
officials that values-based education and discipline were once 
again permissible-and desirable-goals; the student-centered 
approach to Government as Educator could be tempered. 
1:1:1. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684 (citing cases "recogniz[ingj the obvious concern on the 
part of parents, and school authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect children-
especially in a captive audience-from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd 
speech"). 
1:14. /d. at 681-85 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 1:18 U.S. 726 (1 978)). Pacifica 
concerned George Carlin's famous "Seven Dirty Words" stand-up routine. 
135. See, e.g., Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 115 F.:3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006); 
see also Brian J. Bilford, Harper's Bazaar: The Marketplace of Ideas and Hate Speech in 
Schools, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 117 (2008) (analyzing Harper, its effects, and alternative 
grounds for regulating hate speech in schools). 
1:16. See Francisco M. Ner,>Ton, Jr., A Foot in the Dour( The Unwitting Move 
Towards a ''New" Student Welfare Standard in Student Speech after Morse v. 
Frederick, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1221 (2009). 
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The Court continued to cabin Tinker in Hazelwood School 
District v. Kuhlmeier. 137 Compared to Fraser, the facts in 
Kuhlmeier conjured up an image of much greater apparent 
constitutional significance, at least in the abstract: freedom of 
the press. In Kuhlmeier, a high school principal removed two 
pages of articles from a school's student-run newspaper out of 
various content-related objections. The offending articles 
discussed divorce, pregnancy, birth control, and teenage sex, 
and the principal, among other objections, believed that the 
articles insufficiently protected the confidentiality of some 
student sources and also contained material unsuitable for 
some students. 138 Several journalism students sued, arguing 
that the principal's censorship violated their First Amendment 
rights. 
Again, the Court worked around the Tinker standard by 
largely ignoring it, even though the Eighth Circuit panel 
below-like the lower courts in Fraser-felt compelled to follow 
a substantial-disruption approach. 139 Instead, the Court 
questioned whether or not the school newspaper was a public 
forum. 140 As the product of the school's "Journalism II" class, 
the Court held that the newspaper was not a public forum 
because students primarily used it for applying lessons learned 
from the course's curriculum. 141 The Court could have ended 
the inquiry there and decided the case on narrow grounds: no 
forum, no First Amendment rights. The Court, however, went 
on to address the broader issue of "whether the First 
Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote 
particular student speech." 142 That question, according to the 
Court, "concerns educators' authority over school-sponsored 
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive 
activities that students, parents and members of the public 
137. 48~ u.s. 260(1988). 
138. ld. at 262-65. 
139. /d. at 26~-65; Kuhlmcier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist, 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 
1986). 
140. ~8~ U.S. at 270 (It is this [forum] standard, rather than our decision in 
Tinker, that governs this case."). 
141. !d. at 267-70 (ruling that "school facilities may he deemed to he public forums 
only if school authorities have 'by policy or by practice' opened those facilities 'for 
indiscriminate use by the general public" (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local 
B:ducators' Ass'n, ~60 U.S. 87, 47 (19Kl))). 
142. !d. at 270-71. 
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might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the 
school." 143 
This framing virtually ensures that school administrators 
will have a long list of subjective and apparently curricular-
related factors, beyond the Tinker and Fraser standards, at 
their disposal from which they can easily craft a justifiable 
excuse for regulating student speech. 144 At one point, the 
opinion even suggests that educators can regulate student 
speech made pursuant to curricular activities when the speech 
leads a school authority to believe that a third party could 
believe, even erroneously, that the speech reflects the school's 
endorsement. 145 These school-authority expanding possibilities 
are subtly woven into the Kuhlmeier Court's ultimate holding, 
which sounds reasonable enough on a first reading: "educators 
do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial 
control over the style and content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 146 But 
neither "school-sponsored expressive activities" nor "legitimate 
pedagogical concerns" serve as a useful protection of student 
speech when both components are defined by the same 
educational authorities they ostensibly regulate. 
Like Fraser, Kuhlmeier sees the Court taking a case of 
narrow scope and application, and easily decidable under 
Tinker, 147 and expanding the teacher-centered Government as 
Educator's role to include inculcating moral and ethical values. 
In Kuhlmeier, this is not only evident from the Court's laundry 
list of legitimate pedagogical factors that could justify 
restricting student speech, 14R but also its broad interpretation 
of Fraser's standard. In Kuhlmeier, the Court cites Fraser for 
the proposition that "a school must also retain the authority to 
113. ld. at 271. 
144. Id. at 271-72 (discussing various subjective factors, including speaker and 
audience maturity, quality of speech and presentation, adequacy of student research, 
potential bias, topic sensitivity. portrayals of teenage sexuality, and even student 
speech that might "associate the school with any position other than neutrality on 
matters of political controversy"). 
145. Id. at 271 ("Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over [curricular-
related student speech] to assure ... that the views of the individual speaker are not 
erroneously attributed to the school."). 
146. !d. at 273. 
147. This was, in fact, ,Justice Brennan's position. See id. at 277-291 (Brennan .• J., 
dissenting). 
148. Id. at 271-72; see also supra, note 128. 
r 
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refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be 
perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or 
conduct otherwise inconsistent with 'the shared values of a 
civilized social order."' 149 But Fraser had nothing to do with 
drugs or alcohol-those words appear nowhere in the 
decision-and Fraser's speech advocated, at most, irresponsible 
sexual humor. Yet, citing no less a revered opinion than Brown 
v. Board of Education, the Kuhlmeier Court explicitly 
conscripts educators into a Government-as-Moral-Educator 
construct, arguing that schools "must" regulate student speech 
regarding such issues "[o]therwise, the schools would be unduly 
constrained from fulfilling their role as 'a principal instrument 
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for 
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust 
normally to his environment.'" 150 
It would take almost two decades, but the Court would 
follow Kuhlmeier to its logical conclusion in its most recent 
student speech case, Morse v. Frederick. 151 Morse gained 
nationwide attention not only because it was the first student 
speech case to reach the Court in nearly twenty years, but 
because the focus of the case was a high school senior's 
fourteen-foot banner that read "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS." 152 Like 
Fraser, Morse's background facts featured standard-issue 
immature teenage behavior. In January 2002, administrators 
at a high school in Juneau, Alaska, dismissed class for part of 
the school day to observe the Olympic Torch Relay, which was 
passing through Juneau en route to the Olympic Winter Games 
in Salt Lake City. 153 The Relay route caused the Torch to pass 
down the same street as the high school, where students had 
lined both sides of the road. As the Torch approached, a group 
of students revealed the "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" banner. The 
school principal suspended one of the students for ten days 
because "she thought [the banner] encouraged illegal drug use, 
149. /d. at 272 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 103 v. Fraser, 178 U.S. 675, 683 
(1986)). 
150. !d. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., :317 U.S. 483, 493 (1951)). 
151. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
152. /d. at :397. Indeed, Morse is often referred to simply as "Bong Hits." See, e.g., 
Sean K Nuttall, Note, Rethinhing the Narrative in Student Speech Cases, 83 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1282, 128:3 (2008) (referring to Morse throughout as "the Bong Hits case" and 
"Bong Hits"). 
153. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397. 
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in violation of established school policy." 154 The student 
claimed that the banner was '"nonsense meant to attract 
television cameras."' 155 
A plurality of the Court ruled that the student did not have 
a First Amendment right to show a "pro-drug banner" at a 
school-sponsored event, holding "that schools may take steps to 
safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can 
reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use." 156 
Regardless of what meaning the student assigned to the 
banner's "cryptic" words, Chief Justice Roberts's plurality 
opinion argued that the banner made an "undeniable reference 
to illegal drugs" and as such there was "no meaningful 
distinction between celebrating illegal drug use in the midst of 
fellow students and outright advocacy or promotion." 157 And, in 
a merger of student speech and school search doctrine, the 
Court argued that schools had an "important" if not 
"compelling" interest in "deterring drug use by 
schoolchildren." 158 Combined with evidence of a "serious" 
national drug problem, 159 Congress's apparent "declar[ation] 
that part of a school's job is educating students about the 
dangers of illegal drug use," 160 and the familiar "'special 
characteristics of the school environment,"' 161 the Morse 
plurality saw no constitutional barrier to "allow[ing] schools to 
restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as 
promoting illegal drug use." 162 
Differing opinions on Morse's scope, however, divided the 
Court. Justice Alito wrote a separate concurrence that rejected 
the idea that schools can "censor any student speech that 
interferes with a school's 'educational mission,"' 163 an 
expansive Fraser-based argument made by the district that 
went unchallenged in the plurality opinion. Instead, Justice 
Alito argued that the plurality holding restricted only student 
154. I d. The suspension was later reduced to eight days. 
155. Jd. at 101. 
156. Id. at :~97. 
157. I d. at 101-02. 
158. Jd. at 107 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 17,J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995)). 
159. I d. (citing studies). 
160. Id. at 408 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 7111(d)(6) (2000 ed., Supp. lV)). 
161. Jd. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., :l9:l U.S. 503, 506 
(1969)). 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 42:3 (Alita, .J., concurring). 
f 
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speech that "a reasonable observer would interpret as 
advocating illegal drug use" and not student speech that could 
"plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or 
social issue." 164 Beyond this, he did not believe Morse modified 
or augmented Tinker, Fraser, or Kuhlmeier. 165 
Yet, Morse potentially did more than "make good" on 
Kuhlmeier's suggestion that regulating drug-related student 
speech could be justified by the "shared values of a civilized 
social order." Justice Alita's concurrence went on to suggest 
that the "special characteristic of schools" at play in Morse was 
that "schools can be places of special danger" that pose a 
"threat to the physical safety of students." 166 The special 
danger in Morse, according to Justice Alita, was student 
"[s]peech advocating illegal drug use." 167 Ironically, rather than 
cabining Morse's reach, this "physical safety" justification 
provided potential grounds for expanding school 
administrators' authority to regulate student speech. 168 
2. School Searches 
Decided between Fraser and Kuhlmeier, T.L.O. applied for 
the first time the Fourth Amendment to searches of students in 
public schools. 169 Like its student-speech contemporaries, 
T.L.O. created a standard that, while reasonable on its surface, 
would eventually be used to justify a more teacher-centered 
role for the Government as Educator. Unlike the student 
speech cases, however, the student-search line of cases is tied 
together by one overarching theme: the War on Drugs. 
T.L.O., like Fraser and Morse, started as a case about 
stereotypical high school misbehavior. T.L.O. was accused of 
smoking cigarettes in a school bathroom, which she denied, 
landing her in the office. During questioning, a school 
administrator searched T.L.O.'s purse, uncovering not only the 
164. !d. at 122. 
165. !d. 
166. !d. at 124-25. 
167. /d. at 425. 
168. Some lower courts have already seized on this "physical safety" rationale. See, 
e.g, !'once v. Socorro lndep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding that a 
student's allegedly creative-writing style diary entries, containing plotlines in which 
acts of mass violence were committed at school by the student and fictional characters, 
were not entitled to First Amendment protection because they constituted threats 
against the school population). 
169. New .Jersey v. T.L.O., 169 U.S. 325 (1985). 
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suspected contraband cigarettes, but also drug paraphernalia. 
A subsequent and more intensive search of the purse turned up 
marijuana and evidence that T.L.O. had been dealing drugs on 
campus. 170 T.L.O. sued to suppress the drug-related evidence, 
arguing that the school administrator had violated her Fourth 
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches when he 
continued to search her purse after finding the cigarettes, 
which were the only impermissible items that T.L.O. was 
suspected of carrying. 171 
The Court held that T.L.O. was entitled to the Fourth 
Amendment's protection, but upheld the search of her purse on 
a novel "reasonableness" standard, which, given the "special 
characteristics" inherent in the school environment, was a 
lower standard of protection than probable cause. 172 The 
reasonableness standard consists of two parts: an inquiry into 
whether the search was "justified at its inception," and an 
examination of the search's scope. Within those two parts, the 
Court gave further guidance: 
Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a 
teacher or other school official will be "justified at its 
inception" when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting 
that the search will turn up evidence that the student has 
violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the 
school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the 
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of 
the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age 
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. 173 
Although this standard was derived almost from whole 
cloth, 174 the Court believed that the reasonableness standard 
was a less confusing standard for educators because, unlike 
probable cause or individualized suspicion, it did not come with 
a complex legal history. Rather, the Court envisioned that the 
reasonableness standard would allow school authorities to 
respond quickly and flexibly to myriad situations by using 
170. ld. at 328. 
171. ld. at 329-33. 
172. ld. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring). 
17::3. ld. at 341-42 (majority opinion). 
17 4. I d. at :154 (Brennan, ,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (advocating for 
a probable cause standard). 
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"common sense" while also protecting students from 
unnecessary and invasive searches. 175 
Given that school administrators had no guidance from the 
Court prior to T.L.O., it is unclear whether the decision itself 
pushed for a more teacher-centered or student-centered role for 
the Government as Educator. Students likely had varying 
experiences depending on the personalities of school 
administrators and cultural norms in individual schools and 
districts. The new standard, for example, might have increased 
teacher-centeredness by empowering previously-reluctant 
school authorities to feel more confident in taking action to 
protect schools against a perceived increase in "drug use and 
possession of weapons." 176 On the other hand, as Justice 
Stevens indicated in his separate opinion, there undoubtedly 
were overbearing school authorities for whom T.L.O. should 
have served as a student-centered wake-up call. 177 
Nevertheless, the majority clearly believed that it had 
fashioned a standard that adequately accounted for the 
concerns of both students and educators. 178 
Even under a student-centered reading, however, T.L.O.-
like Tinker in the student speech context-contained the seeds 
of an expansively teacher-centered Government as Educator. 
As with Fraser, the Court provided little guidance to, but left 
great discretion in, local school authorities. The majority 
assumed that the reasonableness standard would "ensure that 
the interests of students will be invaded no more than is 
necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving order in 
the schools" 179 But what is necessary to preserve order depends 
on the contexts of individual schools and the beliefs of school 
authorities, as demonstrated by Safford and other cases in 
which school authorities continued to strip search students 
long after T.L.O suggested that such searches were 
unreasonable. 180 The reasonableness standard also arguably 
175. !d. at :H:i (majority opinion). 
176. !d. at a52~5a (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). 
177. /d. at :l82 n.25 (Stevens, ,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing 
various strip search cases). 
178. Id. at 8:38 (majority opinion) ("Although this Court may take notice of the 
difficulty of maintaining discipline in the public schools today, the situation is not so 
dire that students in the schools may claim no legitimate expectations of privacy."). 
179. Id. at 81:3. 
180. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2688, 2618~44 (2009) (citing 
Thomas v. Roberts, :32:3 F.8d 950 (11th Cir. 2003) and Williams v. Ellington, 986 F.2d 
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envisioned searches conducted to ferret out violations of school 
rules in addition to unlawful activity. 181 Thus, regardless of the 
T.L.O. Court's conception of the Government as Educator, in 
practice the decision left open the teacher-centered possibility 
that the reasonableness standard would allow the most 
egregious searchers-of-students to continue their practices 
unaltered and encourage more circumspect school authorities 
to begin invasive searches for the first time. 
The Court confronted two cases in this latter category in 
Vernonia School District v. Acton 182 and Board of Education v. 
Earls, 183 which upheld two school districts that conditioned 
students' participation in extracurricular activities on their 
consenting to suspicionless drug tests. Decided in 1995, 
Vernonia blessed the then-emerging movement among school 
authorities to fight student drug use through the randomized 
drug testing of students involved in extracurricular athletics. 
The case concerned such a program instituted by an Oregon 
school district to combat an "epidemic" of student misbehavior 
that "'was being fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as well as the 
students' misperceptions about the drug culture"' promoted by 
student-athlete campus leaders. 184 The school district reasoned 
that testing student athletes would cause a trickle-down effect, 
reducing drug use among students and preventing drug-related 
athletic injuries. 185 Under the district's testing program, ten 
percent of in-season athletes were randomly selected on a 
weekly basis for urine tests. Those who tested positive were 
required to either enter a treatment program or sit out of 
athletics for at least the remainder of the season. 186 
Citing the "special needs ... in the public school context" 
that gave rise to T.L.O.'s reasonableness standard, 187 the Court 
881 (6th Cir. 1991)). 
181. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at :~71 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(" ... 1 fear that the concerns that motivated the Court's activism have produced a 
holding that will permit school administrators to search students suspected of violating 
only the most trivial school regulations and guidelines fur behavior."). 
182. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
183. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Puttawatumie County v. Earls. 5:36 
U.S. 822 (2002). 
181. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 619 (citation omitted). 
185. !d. at 619-50. 
186. Jd. at 650-51. 
187. !d. at 65:3 (arguing that the reasonableness standard is justified in schools 
because "the warrant requirement 'would unduly interfere with the maintenanee of the 
swift and informal disciplinary procedures [that are] needed,' and 'strict adherence to 
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upheld the drug tests as valid under the Fourth Amendment 
even though the program did not require "individualized 
suspicion of wrongdoing." 188 Justice Scalia's majority opinion 
argued that students had greatly reduced expectations of 
privacy in schools because they "are (1) children, who (2) have 
been committed to the temporary custody the State as 
schoolmaster," 189 a relationship that "is custodial and tutelary, 
permitting [the State] a degree of supervision and control [over 
students] that could not be exercised over free adults." 190 
Because of this relationship, school authorities were justified in 
using the "negligib[ly]" intrusive collection of urine samples to 
meet their "important-indeed, perhaps compelling" interest in 
"[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren." 191 
Following Vernonia, school districts across the country 
began experimenting with student drug testing. Although 
many districts followed Vernonia's lead and established drug 
testing policies only for student athletes, some saw the case as 
justifying drug testing of all students engaged in 
extracurricular activities, 192 and a few even attempted to 
implement drug testing for all students. 193 Courts were also 
divided on whether a district needed to show a history of drug 
problems before implementing a drug test regime. 194 As 
uncertainty about Vernonia's reach grew, so did calls for the 
Court to revisit the issue. 195 
the requirement that searches he based upon probable cause' would undercut 'the 
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the 
schools"' (citing New ,Jersey v. 'I'.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340, 341 (1985))). 
188. /d. (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8). 
189. !d. at 654. 
190. !d. at 655. Scalia also argued that students in general have greatly reduced 
expectations of privacy because they are subject to vaccination policies, and that 
student athletes in particular enjoy even less privacy because they engage in 
"communal undress" for athletic activities and voluntarily agree to greater "regulation" 
such as mandatory grade requirements and physical exams. /d. at 656-58. 
191. Jd. at 660-6:3 (citing studies showing that teens are particularly vulnerable to 
drug use). 
192. See, e.g, Todd v. Rush County Schs., 133 F.3d 981 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding 
drug testing of students engaged in non-athletic extracurricular activities). 
193. See. e.!{ .. Tannahill ex rel. Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist., 133 F. Supp. 
2d 919 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (striking down mandatory drug testing of all students enrolled 
in district's middle and high schools). 
191. See, e.g., Gardner ex rei. Gardner v. Tulia Indep. Sch. Dist., 183 F. Supp. 2d 
851, 856 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (striking down district's drug testing program because "no 
major or widespread drug problem existed within any segment of the [district] student 
body"). 
195. See, e.g., ,Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1067 (7th 
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In Earls, the Court expanded permissible drug testing to 
include students involved in non-athletic extracurricular 
activities in schools with no "major" drug problem. 196 Citing the 
existence of a "nationwide epidemic of drug use," the Court 
disavowed that Vernonia's principles extended only to districts 
which a long history of drug-related issues, "refus[ing] to 
fashion what would in effect be a constitutional quantum of 
drug use necessary to show a 'drug problem."' 197 As in 
Vernonia, the Court also declined to impose an individualized 
suspicion standard on school authorities, reasoning that such a 
standard would unduly burden classroom teachers, who would 
be forced to be the front line of defense against drug-using 
students, 198 and "unfairly target members of unpopular 
groups." 199 Instead, the majority opted to stick with T.L.O.'s 
reasonableness standard and found that the program in Earls 
was "a reasonably effective means" of fighting student drug 
use. 
In its holding, however, the Earls majority added a new 
teacher-centered gloss to the scope of governmental interests at 
stake in Vernonia. Where Vernonia mentioned only preventing 
or deterring drug use,200 Earls added that districts have a 
"legitimate concern[] in ... detecting drug use."201 The former 
Cir. 2000) ("The scope of Vernonia remains undecided today. Until we receive further 
guidance from the Supreme Court, we shall stand by .... "). 
196. Bd. of Educ. of lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 5:3fi 
U.S. 822, 813 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing the Pottawatomie County 
Superintendent's description of the perceived drug problem). The majority opinion. 
authored by Justice Thomas, did cite instances of drug-related behavior that hardly 
seem out of the ordinary for a high school of any size as sufficient evidence of a "drug 
problem." The Court specifically cited as examples: district teachers seeing some 
students "who appeared" to be on drugs and overhearing others talking about drug use, 
finding "marijuana cigarettes" in the school parking lot, "once" discovering "drugs or 
drug paraphernalia" in a student's car, and some district parents reporting concern 
about "the 'drug situation."' Id. at 835. 
197. Id. at 8:16. 
198. It is not clear why the majority believed this to be so. as state statutes often 
make teachers mandatory reporters for abuse and neglect. See, e.g, CAL. P"NAL Com:§ 
11165.7 (2009). Drug use, as an indicator of abuse, neglect, or other problems affecting 
students' well-being, is already something for which educators are ethically obligated 
to be on the lookout. 
199. Earls, 53fi U.S. at 8:17. 
200. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 17J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 6<16, fi50, 661 (1995) ("[The drug 
testing program's] expressed purpose is to prevent student athletes from using drugs, 
to protect their health and safety, and to provide drug users with assistance 
programs."). 
201. Earls, 536 U.S. at 8:18 (italics added). 
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interest does not require districts to take an active role; 
districts could deter drug use by passive mechanisms such as 
increasing drug-prevention education or voluntary on-campus 
drug counseling programs. These forms potentially preserve a 
greater role for student autonomy. The latter interest, however, 
obliges the Government as Educator to affirmatively identify 
student drug users. 
As the previous Part has argued, the Court's conception of 
the Government as Educator has evolved to support an 
expansive teacher-centered role in both the student speech and 
school search contexts. This evolution is significant because 
student speech and school search cases force the Court to 
balance the rights of students directly against the perceived 
"special needs" of school authorities in a way unlike other areas 
of school-related law such as school finance, alternative 
governance, or student religious expression. Put in terms of the 
pedagogical lens used throughout this Article, student speech 
and school search cases see the Government as Educator in its 
most direct interactions with its students. Thus, in articulating 
these strands of opinions, the Court not only expounds legal 
doctrine, it helps "inculcate" various values and social 
expectations related to the operation of the nation's public 
schools and the responsibilities of students. As a result, the 
Court's conception of the Government as Educator's proper role 
and scope of authority influences the public's ideas about the 
Government as Educator.202 This does not mean that the Court 
always drives education-related public opinion; as observed 
earlier in this Article, the Court often settles "cases and 
controversies" resulting from long-percolating educational 
disputes. 
In student speech and school search cases over the last 
quarter-century, however, the Court has settled those disputes 
by favoring the teacher-centered interests of school authorities 
in securing order and instilling values over students' interests 
in experiencing education for citizenship free of unnecessary 
"measures that diminish constitutional protections."203 
Moreover, the Court has essentially delegated to school 
authorities the responsibility for deciding not only whether 
202. !d. at 855 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Government is nowhere more a 
teacher than when it runs a public school."). 
20:3. !d. 
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measures are necessary but also if they are permissible. Rather 
than simply tilting the playing field in favor of school 
authorities, the Court has allowed them to write the rulebook. 
In doing so, the Court has left it up to educators to define the 
Government as Educator, allowing the values of school 
authorities to substitute for the values historically associated 
with education for citizenship. But if the "government is the 
potent, the omnipresent teacher,"204 what does this approach 
mean for schools and students? 
III. CONSEQUENCES 
The idea that "school officials should be accorded the widest 
authority in maintaining discipline and good order in their 
institutions,"205 in and of itself, probably does not offend the 
sensibilities of many except the most libertarian-minded. 
Without some order in schools, the educational process would 
grind to a halt; schools would indeed come to exemplify Justice 
Alito's "places of special danger." That being said, there is a 
difference between according the "widest authority absolutely" 
and the "widest authority necessary"-a difference analogous to 
that between a teacher-centered and student-centered 
conception of the Government as Educator. As argued in Part 
II, the Court's student speech and school search caselaw has 
evolved in a more teacher-centered direction over the last three 
decades. Whether this shift was motivated out of a desire to 
simply avoid acting as the nation's school board or a conscious 
decision to empower school authorities, the Court's deference to 
educators' goals has consequences beyond abstract legal 
doctrine. Three of these consequences are analyzed below. 
A. The Educationalization of the Government as Educator 
As the expansion of the reasonableness standard from 
general school-based searches for contraband to the drug 
testing of students involved in extracurricular activities 
demonstrates, allowing educators to define the Government as 
Educator promotes educational authorities' ever-expanding 
204. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 138, 185 (1928) (Brandeis, .J., dissenting). 
205. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., :l9:l U.S. 50:l, 526 (1969) 
(Harlan, J ., dissenting). 
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social agenda for the public schools. For a variety of reasons,2°6 
public schools in the United States today are expected to solve 
myriad social problems ranging from "ameliorat[ing] race and 
class inequality" to encouraging "healthy eating . . . and 
preservation of natural resources."207 This "educationalizing" of 
social problems results in part from a desire to "pursue our 
social goals in a way that is in line with the individualism at 
the heart of the liberal ideal, aiming to solve social problems by 
seeking to change the hearts, minds, and capacities of 
individual students,"208 and in part because educators tend to 
share a messianic "vision of saving the world by fixing the 
child."209 As a result, "educationalization has consistently 
pushed education to expand its scope well beyond both what it 
should do and what it can do," even though the "result is a 
record of one failure after another."210 
In this light, student drug testing in public schools, by 
further extending the War on Drugs into America's classrooms, 
represents a classic case of educationalizing a social problem. 
In the context of this Article, more importantly, it also presents 
a case in which the Court's conception of the Government as 
Educator has fostered educationalization. Indeed, the growth of 
the student drug testing movement tracks the Court's decisions 
in Vernonia and Earls. Prior to Vernonia, only about twenty 
schools in the entire country engaged in student drug 
testing;211 by the time the Court decided Earls in 2002 that 
number had increased to over a thousand.212 Studies conducted 
after Earls indicate that at least fourteen percent of all school 
districts use some form of student drug testing,213 and the 
evidence suggests that the number is "rapidly increasing."214 
Beyond a district-by-district approach, some states have used 
Vernonia and Earls to justify the creation of statewide steroid 
206. See, e.g., Laharee, supra note 23, at 449-55 (discussing eight reasons for 
educationalization's success). 
207. !d. at 447. 
208. !d. at 118. 
209. !d. at 151. 
210. !d. at 118. 
211. Kyle Barrington, Voluntary, Randomized, Student Drug Testing: Impact in a 
Rural, Low-income Community, 52 .J. ALCOHOL & DRUG EDUC. 47, 49 (2008). 
212. ld. 
213. See, e.g., Chris Rin!-,>walt, et. a!., Random Drug Testing in US Public School 
Districts. 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 826 (2008). 
211. Barrington, supra note 211, at 49. 
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testing regimes for student athletes,215 implemented-not 
coincidentally-in the wake of Congress's hearings on steroid 
use in baseball.216 
The educationalization of the War on Drugs, moreover, did 
not simply proceed out of Vernonia and Earls's holdings, which 
as a formal matter simply pronounced student drug testing as 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Rather, as Justice 
Breyer's concurrence in Earls makes clear,217 at least some 
Justices on the Court intended that precise result. In 
supporting the Earls majority's opinion, Justice Breyer felt 
compelled to "emphasize several underlying considerations," 
which he "underst[ood] to be consistent with the Court's 
opinion."218 Acknowledging that drugs posed a "serious" 
problem "in terms of size, the kinds of drugs being used, and 
the consequences of that use both for our children and 
[society]," Justice Breyer argued that the "government's 
emphasis on supply side interdiction" had failed to stop teenage 
drug use.219 Solving this problem, according to Justice Breyer, 
fell to public schools,220 but not simply because student drug 
testing attempted to reduce student demand for drugs "by 
changing the school's environment" in a way that mitigated 
peer pressure-induced drug use.221 He was clear that public 
schools must shoulder greater responsibility for fighting the 
War on Drugs because the public had come to expect schools to 
solve social problems.222 In other words, conducting drug tests 
on students is acceptable because society expects schools to 
educationalize-even if that means usmg suspicionless 
215. See, e.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 33.091 (Vernon's 2008). The first version of 
Texas's steroid testing program was passed in 2005. See, H. B. :J56:l, 79th Leg., (Tex. 
2005). 
216. See Restoring Faith in America's Pastime: /~valuating Major Lea!Jue 
Baseball's Efforts to Eradicate Steroid Use: Hearing Before the Comm. on Gov't Reform. 
109th Cong. (2005). 
217. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 5:l6 
U.S. 822, 8;)8 (2002) (Breyer, .J., concurring). 
218. Jd. at 8:39. 
219. fd. 
220. ld. at 810 ("[P]ublic school systems must find effective ways to deal with this 
problem."). 
221. Id. at 840-11. 
222. ld. at 840 ("Today's public expects its schools not simply to teach the 
fundamentals, but 'to shoulder the burden of feeding students breakfast and lunch, 
offering before and after school child care services, and providing medical and 
psychological services,' all in a school environment that is safe and encourages 
learning."). 
l 
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searches or, even after Safford, strip searches. And, 
educationalization of the War on Drugs has not been confined 
to the school search context; the Morse plurality opinion cited 
and quoted extensively from the Court's school search line of 
cases.223 
The Court's teacher-centered deference to 
educationalization in the student speech and school search 
contexts cannot be explained away as simply the recognition of 
social phenomenon outside the Court's bailiwick or limitations 
on institutional competency. 224 The Court, after all, has 
stepped in to referee other disputes concerning local school 
authorities' attempts at managing social problems through the 
public schools. In the context of religious expression, for 
example, the Court has acted to police the use of public schools 
as a means to inculcate religious values both at the hands of 
school authorities225 and students.226 The Court also held 
constitutional the use of school "vouchers" by recognizing, at 
least in part, their use by underprivileged students and their 
families as a potential alternative to failing public schools.227 
And, perhaps most famously, the Court itself ordered the 
educationalization of desegregation, first, paradoxically, in the 
lightly-regulated realm of higher education228 and then in the 
K-12 public schools.229 
22:1. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 406-09 (2007). 
221. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2640, n.1 
(2009) ("[Tjhe legitimacy of the rule usually goes without saying as it does here. The 
Court said plainly in [T.L.O.J that standards of conduct for schools are for school 
administrators to determine without second-guessing by courts lacking the experience 
to appreciate what may be needed."). 
225. See l~ngel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (school prayer); see also Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (clergy-led nondenominational invocation at 
graduation); l~dwards v. Aguillard, 182 U.S. 578 (1987) (teaching creationism in public 
schools). 
226. See Santa Fe lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 5:JO U.S. 290 (2000) (student-led 
invocation over public address system). 
227. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 6:39 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
("While the romanticized ideal of universal public education resonates with the 
cognoscenti who oppose vouchers, poor urban families just want the best education for 
their children, who will certainly need it to function in our high-tech and advanced 
society."). 
228. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 3:39 U.S. 629 (1950) (desegregated law schools); 
see also McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 6:n (1950) (decided the same day as 
Sweatt, dese~o'Tegated higher education generally). 
229. See, e.g, Brown v. Bd. of gduc., il4 7 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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B. Real Schools and Legitimacy Squared 
It may be, then, that some members of the Court have come 
to expect "real schools" to act in certain ways in the student 
speech and school search contexts. Justice Breyer suggested as 
much when he intimated that those schools failing to 
"adequately to carry out [their] responsibilities" to combat 
certain social problems "may well see parents send their 
children to private or parochial school instead."230 If so, the 
Court has created a Catch-22: If today education is seen as a 
"legitimating system,"231 so too is the Supreme Court.232 Thus, 
when the Court upholds certain school-related practices, it 
gives added legitimacy to processes that already have been 
legitimized by virtue of being implemented by school 
authorities. This "legitimacy cycle" not only reduces the 
probability of successfully challenging such practices in the 
short-run, it drives societal-expectations regarding the 
appropriate structure and functions of public schools. In the 
long-run, these processes become permanent fixtures of 
schooling. 
In education reform literature, the "Real Schools" construct 
addresses the paradoxical similarity of public schools given 
greatly varied on-the-ground realities.233 In the classic 
exposition of the construct, Mary Metz observed several 
different public schools use what appeared to be a "common 
script" in matters ranging from curriculum to school 
management.234 Under the common script, teachers assigned 
similar work from the same textbooks and taught students in a 
similar manner, all seemingly without regard to the 
background differences of their students.235 Underneath this 
superficial equality of treatment across schools, however, Metz 
found that educators and administrators greatly "watered 
230. Bd. of Educ. of lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. l~arls, 5~l6 
U.S. 822, 840 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
231. See, e.g., John W. Meyer, The Effects of Education as an Institution, 8:i AM. J. 
Soc. 55, 73 (1977) ("Once institutionalized education is seen as a legitimating system--
not just a mechanism for allocating fixed opportunities-it can have many net 
consequences on both allocation and socialization of people being processed, just as on 
the rest of society."). 
232. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMEI{, THE PEOI'LE THEM>;t;;LV";s: I'OI'UL!\1{ 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ,JUDICIAL REV I ";w (2004). 
2:~3. See, e.g., Metz, supra note 24. 
234. !d. at 76. 
2:35. !d. at 76--79. 
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down" expectations in certain schools.236 In one majority-
minority, high-poverty high school, for example, Metz found 
that a "formal curriculum as demanding as that in our highest 
SES schools, including texts and primary readings that were 
just as difficult, was contradicted by student skills and written 
work that were infinitely weaker."237 
Nonetheless, Metz saw the same common script at work in 
school after school, a phenomenon she called "Real School": the 
replication and reproduction of certain institutional norms that 
"assured all participants that they were teaching and learning 
in a Real School" and were "Real Teachers and Real 
Students."238 Besides this symbolic "ritual" purpose,239 Metz 
attributed the prevalence of the common script to Americans' 
concern for equality; they "want to be able to assume that all 
schools follow a common template and can be said to be offering 
the same, commonly understood and commonly valued, high 
school education."240 Educational authorities replicate the 
common script because society has come to see in its 
manifestations a "guarantor of equity across schools."241 Thus, 
society looks askance at deviations from the common script and 
perceives as legitimate those processes that, through custom, 
practice, or policy, have managed to become the script's 
component parts.242 
The educationalization of social problems presents a 
potential new component to Metz's common script: the idea 
that Real Schools educationalize. To the extent society expects 
public education as an institution to take on an expanded social 
mission, educationalization itself correspondingly becomes a 
legitimate part of school's structure. This is consonant with 
organizational theory that suggests large formal organizations 
like school expand in part by incorporating into their 
structures the means to address emerging "rationalized 
23G. /d. at 78-79. 
237. /d. at 83. For example, Metz observed an English class filled with students 
who could not write a simple business letter, but who were also expected to read 
Dante's Inferno. 
238. ld. 
239. /d. at 81. 
210. /d. at 81. 
241. ld. at 8G. 
242. See, e.g, .John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: 
Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 88AM. J. Soc. 310 (1977). 
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institutional myths."243 Educational authorities use general 
societal anxiety about out-of-control students and drug use, for 
example, to justify the adoption of new forms of social control 
in schools, such as disciplinary alternative education, zero-
tolerance policies, highly-restrictive dress codes, and, of course, 
drug testing programs. In turn, the accoutrements associated 
with school expand to include separate alternative campuses, 
school resource officers, deans of students, and drug testing 
personnel and practices. These modifications in school's formal 
structure and mission "demonstrate that it is acting on 
collectively valued purposes in a proper and adequate manner," 
legitimizing both school and its new "institutionalized 
elements."244 School authorities are thus incentivized to adopt 
emerging institutional responses as they are legitimized and to 
continually search for new areas of potential mission 
expanswn, especially as society becomes increasingly 
conditioned to expect a school-based response to social 
problems.245 As a result, the rapid increase in student drug 
testing programs can be attributed at least in part to school 
authorities adopting programs out of a sense of obligation-
drug testing has become something that Real Schools do. 246 
This would help explain the spread of drug testing in Vernonia 
and Earls; what started as testing in a district with serious 
drug problems eventually came to be a fixture in a district with 
almost no problem. 
The Supreme Court contributes to this augmentation of the 
common script by supplying "official legitimacy based on legal 
mandates."247 This is because highly rational-legal societies 
243. !d. at ::344-45 ("i\.s rationalizing institutional myths arise in existing domains 
of activity, extant organizations expand their formal structures so as to become 
isomorphic with these new myths."). 
244. /d. at 319; see also id. at ::318 ("School administrators who create new curricula 
or training programs attempt to validate them as legitimate innovations in educational 
theory and government requirements. If they are successful, the new procedures can be 
perpetuated as authoritatively required or at least satisfactory."). 
245. !d. at 350 ("Failure to incorporate the proper elements of structure is 
negligent and irrational; the continued flow of support is threatened and internal 
dissidents are strengthened. i\.t the same time, these myths present organizations with 
great opportunities for expansion."). 
246. The creation of the Student Drug Testing Institute within the fedl,ral 
Department of Education seems to confirm this. SDTl provides federal grants to school 
districts to help cover the cost of implementing drug testing regimes. See STUDENT 
DRUG TESTING INSTITUTE, http://sdti.ed.gov/ (last visited ,Jan. 28, 2010). 
247. Meyer & Rowan, supra note 212, at :H7. 
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like the United States "are especially prone to give collective 
(legal) authority to institutions," like the Court, "which 
legitimate particular organizational structures."248 This is 
closely analogous to popular understanding of the Court as "the 
authoritative constitutional interpreter,"249 whose 
pronouncements regarding constitutionality effectively serve a 
legitimizing/delegitimizing function. When the Court upholds a 
challenged program related to educationalization, then, the 
Court bestows on school-implemented mechanisms the final bit 
of legitimacy necessary to modify the common script. 
This does not mean that only Court-legitimated programs 
get added to the script, but it does suggest that Court approval 
becomes a precondition once a mechanism has been challenged. 
It is perhaps easier to think of this in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. To use student drug testing as an 
example: it is possible that student drug testing could have 
become a part of the common script without Vernonia or Earls. 
Once the issue reached the Court, however, its approval 
became necessary; a contrary holding in either case would have 
either declared student drug testing as illegitimate or cabined 
such programs to narrow circumstances. In the context of 
student speech and school search cases, however, the Court's 
highly-deferential stance towards the decisions of school 
authorities arguably has turned over final responsibility for 
legitimating challenged organizational structures to actors at 
the school level. 
C. Inequality of Political Socialization: A Patchwork 
Federalism of Student Autonomy Experiences 
As the preceding discussion has argued, school officials 
have broad discretion to choose between the competing visions 
of the Government as Educator, which are then implemented 
through policies falling at various points along the continuum 
between teacher-centeredness and student-centeredness. 
School officials, however, make these decisions based on their 
conceptions of what constitutes acceptable degrees of student 
autonomy-decisions that are thus likely to vary from place to 
place. Consequently, students encounter varied treatment of 
218. /d. 
249. Tom Donnelly, Note, Popular Constitutionalism, Civic Education, and the 
Stories We Tell Our Children, 118 YALE L. ,J. 948, 953 (2009). 
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their autonomy interests at the hands of the Government as 
Educator when it comes to student speech and school search 
rights. 
Although at first glance this might appear to be no more 
than a restatement of the commonly accepted conception of 
education as an inherently local concern, the Court has 
continually asserted that students do not "shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate."250 And, constitutional rights are not 
normally things that vary from place to place without 
exceptional justification; despite their differences, the Bill of 
Rights applies with equal vigor to a citizen in San Francisco as 
it does a citizen in rural Mississippi. The Court's student 
speech and school search caselaw nonetheless has created a 
background framework that provides a patina of legitimacy to 
local school officials' varied treatment of student autonomy, a 
construct that would implicate equal protection and due 
process concerns were it applied to adult citizens. 251 Yet, if 
"[t]he schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have to 
experience the power of government" and "the values they 
learn there, they take with them in life,"252 one might ponder 
the political socialization-related consequences of a system that 
allows government entities to treat citizens-albeit students-
250. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., :l9::J U.S. 50:3, 507-08 (1969). 
251. This very concern serves as partial justification of the Court's "special needs" 
doctrine in general. But, it is worth noting here at least one incongruous feature of 
schools within the special needs doctrine: in the school context, the ostensibly regulated 
parties have great discretion in fleshing out the ends and means justified and 
permitted by the special needs inherent in the regulated environment. Thus, the same 
special needs that underlay the Tinher Court's substantial disruption standard evolvPd 
to support the more expansive and malleable potential standards based on student 
welfare and physical safety advanced in Morse. So, too, the expansion of student drug 
testing from the drug-use laden context of Vernonia, which arguably presented 
evidence of special need, to J<Jarls, in which school authorities seemingly strained to 
find evidence of a special-needs-justifying drug problem. Other special needs contexts, 
by contrast, are more limited in discretion, scope, and application or at least concern 
issues of greater import than participation in a high school's marching hand. See, e.g, 
Nat'! Treas. Employees Union v. Von Raab, 189 U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (upholding "the 
suspicionless testing of [customs] employees who apply for promotion to positions 
directly involving the interdiction of illegal drugs, or to positions that require the 
incumbent to carry a firearm"); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n., 189 U.S. 602, 
628 (1989) (upholding suspicionless drug testing of railway personnel who "discharge 
duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of 
attention can have disastrous consequences"). 
252. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 825, 885-86 (1985) (Stevens, .J. concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
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in profoundly different ways depending on where those 
students happen to go to school.25 3 
To briefly speculate on this inequality of political 
socialization, consider the experience of an average student in 
one of two hypothetical school districts, each representing 
either a stridently student-centered or teacher-centered vision 
of the Government as Educator. The student-centered district 
adheres closely to Tinker's substantial-disruption standard, 
exercises little or no editorial control over extracurricular 
activities,254 refuses to subject students to drug tests,255 allows 
students broad expressive rights including a non-restrictive 
dress code, and generally conducts searches of students only 
with individualized suspicion and probable cause.256 On the 
other hand, the teacher-centered district opts for Fraser's 
253. Schools varied treatment of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender students' 
and their associative and expressive interests provides instructive examples. Compare 
Jill Tucker, S.F. School Board OKs New Gay Support Program, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 10, 
2010 (reporting on the San Francisco Unified School Board's decision to earmark 
$120,000 annually "to fund a substantial increase in instruction and services related to 
gay and lesbian issues") with Editorial, Right of Passage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2010, at 
A24 (opining on a Mississippi school district's prohibiting Constance McMillen, a 
lesbian high school senior, from attending prom with her girlfriend); see also Adam 
Lynch, School Cuts Gay Student Photo From Yearbook, JACKSON FREE PRESS, Apr. 26, 
2010, (reporting that a school refused to include a lesbian student's picture in its 
yearbook based on her decision to wear a tuxedo for her senior portrait). Harvey Milk 
High School in New York City, "the nation's first public school for gay and lesbian 
youth," probably stands as one of the most prominent-and controversial--examples of 
schools supporting students' autonomy- and expression-related interests. John 
Colapinto, The Harvey Milk School Has No Right to Exist. Discuss, NEW YORK MAG., 
May 21, 2005, available at: http://nymag.com/nymetro/newslfeatures/10970/. 
254. In some cases state "anti-Hazelwood" statutes affirmatively provide for 
protection of students' speech- and press-related rights. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 
48907 (providing that public school students' free speech rights "includ[e], hut [are] not 
limited to. the use of bulletin boards, the distribution of printed materials or petitions, 
the wearing of buttons, badges, and other insignia," and protect "the right of expression 
in official publications, whether or not the publications or other means of expression 
are supported financially by the school or by use of school facilities .... "). Uniquely, 
California's "Leonard Law" statutorily protects student speech rights both on- and off-
campus and applies even to private schools. CAL. EIJUC. CODE § 48950 (prohibiting the 
"mak[ing] or enforce[ment of] any rule subjecting any high school pupil to disciplinary 
sanctions solely on the basis of conduct that is speech or other communication that, 
when engaged in outside of the campus, is protected from governmental restriction" 
under the federal or California constitutions. 
255. Although not ruled out by a "student-centered" district policy, the Washington 
State Supreme Court struck down suspicionless student drug testing based on its 
interpretation of the Washington State Constitution. See York v. Wahkiakum Sch. /Jist. 
No. 200, 163 Wash. 2d 297, 178 P.3d 995 (2008) (citing WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7). 
256. See id. 
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educational-mission standard,257 pervasively regulates and 
censors extracurricular activities, engages in widespread drug 
testing, imposes a highly-restrictive dress code or uniform 
policy, and frequently subjects students to searches under an 
aggressive interpretation of T.L.O.'s reasonableness standard, 
perhaps even reserving the right to use "strip searches" under 
Safford's safe harbor. 
The Court's teacher-centered conception of the Government 
as Educator allows the existence of both kinds of school 
districts, and undoubtedly both types of districts can be found 
across the United States. It does not involve too much 
speculation to hypothesize that the students undergoing such 
radically different experiences grow up to hold different 
conceptions about what constitutes appropriate government 
authority, contributing to Americans' increasing ideological 
fractionalization. Additionally, from an education-for-
citizenship viewpoint, inequality of political socialization risks 
privileging those students who are allowed greater autonomy 
to practice citizenship in school vis-a-vis those students 
encountering more circumscribed autonomy experiences.25x If 
public schools promote equality of opportunity rather than 
equality of outcome, then students' public school experience 
should provide an equal opportunity to develop and practice 
citizenship. 259 
In short, students are likely to be politically socialized to 
believe in different degrees of acceptable government authority. 
Students in a highly student-centered district are likely to be 
politically socialized to a less authoritarian view of government 
in which the government's proper role is one that allows or 
fosters a wide range of expression, permits values-pluralism, 
and respects expansive conceptions of individual privacy. 
Under a highly teacher-centered experience, students may be 
politically socialized to believe that government should act in a 
more authoritarian capacity, actively regulating or suppressing 
257. See the dismssion of Morse in supra Part ll.C.l. 
258. This assumes that K-12 schools, in addition to inculcating values, can play a 
decisive role in the development of effective citizenship-related skills. But see Curtis G. 
Dailey, Student Speech in Public Schools: A Comprehensive Analytical Frameworh 
Based on the Role of Public Schools in Democratic Education, 2009 B.Y.U. EllUC. & L. 
J. 1, 29-34 (2009) (arguing that K-12 public schools are primarily about values 
inculcation and universities are for "democratic skill development"). 
259. See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, J~ducation, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 
YALE L .• J. 3:30, 3:35 (2006). 
1] STRIPPED OF MEANING 173 
certain forms of expression, engaging in values-promotion and 
values-imposition, and constricting the sphere of permissible 
individual privacy. These are all key components of political 
and ideological identity. 
The general acceptance of inequality in political 
socialization in public schools stands in contrast to intolerance 
of inequality in other areas,260 such as student achievement,261 
teacher quality,262 or per-pupil spending.263 Whether this 
results from education's general susceptibility to arguments 
grounded in "local control"264 or because of assumptions that 
the Government as Educator must, "unlike government in its 
role of government-as-sovereign[,] . . . regularly decide some 
expressions are superior to others,"265 the consequences of such 
inequality are worth exploring. Although an expansive analysis 
of social attitudes is beyond the scope of this Article, further 
research should be conducted into the relationship between 
students' political socialization experiences and later political 
and ideological beliefs. This line of research will become even 
more salient as the federal government increases its role in K-
12 education, exemplified by No Child Left Behind, the Obama 
Administration's "Race to the Top" program, and efforts to 
develop national content area standards, because expanding 
260. See, e.g, JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAm; INEQUALITIES (1991). 
261. See, e.g, THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP (Christopher Jencks & Meredith 
Phillips, cds., 1998). 
262. See, e.g., The Civil Hights Project at Harvard University, Gail L. Sunderman 
& Jimmy Kim, Teacher Quality: Equalizing Educational Outcomes and Opportunities 
(2005), available at: http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu; see also Renee v. 
Duncan, 5n F.~3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009) (concerning the highly-qualified teacher 
provisions of No Child Left Behind) (pending en bane review); Jason Felch, Jason Song 
& Doug Smith, Grading the Teachers: Who's Teaching L.A.'s Kids?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
15, 2010, at A 1 (value-added analysis of teacher effectiveness in the Los Angeles 
Unified School District). 
263. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 111 U.S. 1 (1973); see 
also John Dinan, School Finance Litigation: The Third Wave Recedes, in FROM 
SCHOOLHOUS~; TO COURTHOUSE 9() (Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West, eds., 2009); 
William S. Koski & Jesse Hahne!, The Past, Present, and Possible Futures of Education 
Finance Reform Litigation, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH TN EDUCATION FINANCE AND 
POLICY 12 (Helen F. Ladd & Edward B. Fiske, eds., 2008). 
261. See, e.g., Denis P. Doyle & Chester Finn, Jr., American Schools and the 
Future of Local Control, 77 NAT'L AFFAIRS 77, 77 (.June 1981) ("No term in the lexicon of 
American education is more revered than "local control."). 
2()5. Judith Areen, Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First 
Amendment Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97 Ge;o. L .• J. 945, 993-94 
(2009) ("[d]istinguishing Government as Educator from Government as Sovereign" as a 
means to preserve academic freedom in the context of higher education). 
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federal authority inevitably will challenge the assumptions 
behind and content of traditionally localist conceptions of 
education,266 including values-transmission. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that in the context of its student 
speech and school search caselaw, the Supreme Court has 
adopted a "teacher-centered" conception of the Government as 
Educator that greatly enhances the authority of school 
authorities to inculcate values. This vision of the Government 
as Educator responds to and limits a more student-centered 
possibility in which students would have a greater opportunity 
to practice citizenship. As a result of its strong deference to 
school authorities in the student speech and school search 
contexts, the Court has failed to exercise a potential check on 
the educationalization of social problems and, in turn, the 
expansion of the "Real Schools" construct to include 
ed uca tionaliza tion-related mechanisms. 
Furthermore, the Court's teacher-centered approach has 
profound implications for the political socialization of students. 
If "the stories we tell our schoolchildren matter" and "set the 
terms of our constitutional culture,"267 what lessons do 
students learn from their experience in school environments 
that condition participation in the mock trial team on 
volunteering a urine sample? If "participation in [the common 
script] is ... a ritual that affirms membership in mainstream 
American life,"268 what does it mean for adult citizenship that 
the script limits student expression to certain values acceptable 
to school administrators, who often are ready to use nebulous 
266. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 259, at :399-406 (2006) (making an argument under 
the Fourteenth Amendment that "does not assign constitutional weight to the daim 
that education is an area of 'traditional state concern"' because "[njot only has the 
factual basis for this claim been eroded by recent policy developments culminating in 
NCLB, but the normative element of the claim stands in tension with thl' 
constitutional investiture of authority and responsibility in Congress to secure the 
essential conditions of opportunity for meaningful national citizenship."); Matt Miller, 
First, Kill All the School Boards: A Modest Proposal to Fix the Schools, THE ATLANTIC 
92 (Jan./Feb. 2008). 
267. Donnelly, supra note 249, at 999. 
268. Met;-:, supra note 21, at 87. 
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and expansive standards based on inevitably varied and 
potentially inconsistent conceptions of student welfare? 
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